Alternative approaches to housing code reform. by Kennard, Lydia Helen
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO HOUSING CODE REFORM
by
LYDIA HELEN KENNARD
Bachelor of Arts, Stanford University
(1975)
Juris Doctorate, Harvard Law School
(1979)
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF
MASTER OF CITY PLANNING
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
(August 1, 1979)
Signature of Author..--.-.-.-.-.-.-. -
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Certified by . . . . . .
Michael O'Hare, Thesis Advisor
Accepted by . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . . -.. -. . -
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
OCT 9 1979
LIBRARIES
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO HOUSING CODE REFORM
by
LYDIA HELEN KENNARD
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
on August 1, 1979 in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of Master of City /Planning
ABSTRACT
Three recent studies attempt to explain the economic impact of housing
code enforcement on the supply and price of rental housing. Landlords are
able to pass the costs of code improvemants to their teants: where the
landlord is unable to recoup such costs from current teniants by raising
rents, attracting new tenants at higher rents or reducing operating
expenses, code enforcement will encourage abandonment or convcrision. On
this assumption, concerning the impact of housing code enforcement on
rents, four alternative proposals for reform are analyzed: (1) naintenance
of a single standard code with increased administraLve and enforcement
mechanisms; (2) code enforcement coupled with rent control; (3) flexible
code standards which correspond to the needs of designated housiLng code
districts; and (4) enforcement of a minimum housing code through a
certification program with reliance on private contractual rights to
provide additional housing quality. The minimu-m code certification
program buttressed with private contractual rights is the most feasible
strategy. This proposal allows for a reduction of our present reliance
on ineffective enforcement mechanisms while at the same time provides for
market-defined standards of housing quality which enable tenants to seek
only those housing services for which they are willing and able to pay.
Michael O'Hare, Thesis Advisor
/
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I. INTRODUCTION
The escalating cost of housing across the nation threatens to
render housing unaffordable for increasing numbers of middle income as
well as low income families. Many observers have pointed to over-
regulation of the housing industry, through zoning laws and building
regulations, as a major source of the problem. One of the infrequently
studied regulations on housing with respect to its impact on housing costs
is the municipal housing code.
Housing codes and code enforcement have generally taken a back
seat to more politically controversial issues of municipal government.
Housing codes are considered to be dull, highly technical municipal
regulations with which few citizens come into direct contact. Effective
code enforcement does not produce highly visible improvements to which
politicians can point as evidence of their accomplishments. Instead,
when "a depressed neighborhood has been cleared of housing violations and
has been freed of rodents, the inhabitants may live in more healthful and
comfortable surroundings, but the buildings will still be old and the
neighborhood will look only slightly less shabby." 1
Another reason for the present lack of attention to housing code
enforcement is the fact that housing codes have been successful in the
past. Today, we have succeeded in eliminating, to a large extent, the
substandard housing problems which existed as late as the 1940's and
Gribetz and Grad, Houing Code Endoeement: Sanctions and
Remedies, 66 Columbia Law Review 1254, 1257 (1966).
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1950's. These successes have caused the focus to shift away from code
enforcement to more currently explosive problems. Unfortunately, the
accomplishments of the past have lulled us into a false sense of security.
The construction industry has not been able to keep pace with the
growth in population. Moreover, social change has led to an increase in
the number of young adults and elderly who have set up their own house-
holds. Thus, the demand for housing far exceeds the supply. This
situation has been aggravated by the inflationary rise in the cost of
land and financing along with increases in taxes and construction and
repair costs. The result is that individuals and families are forced
into housing which has long outlived its useful life expectancy.
Although substandard housing exists in rural as well as in urban
areas, the urban housing crisis has been exacerbated by demographic
change, particularly since World War II, which accounts for the disinte-
gration of the central city tax base as the middle class moved en masse
to the suburbs. The poor were left behind with a municipal government
unable to support their needs, including the need for adequate housing.
The purpose of housing codes is to insure that housing is
utilized and maintained in a fashion which "reduces the risk to human
life and safety to an acceptable minimum."3 Housing that does not meet
code standards4 is generally occupied by persons at the lowest end of
2O'Bannon, Building Depa/tment Adminit'ation, 509 (1973).
3 Id. at 10.
4To avoid confusion as to terminology, "substandard housing" will
be used to refer to housing which does not meet the standards set by
current housing codes, even though these codes are not in actuality
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the income scale. For the most part, members of the wealthier income
groups can afford, and choose, newer units which meet code standards, or
older units which have been maintained in compliance with code
requirements. In contrast, unsubsidized new construction for the poor
has long ceased to be economically feasible,5 and thus lower income
families, not housed in subsidized units, are forced to occupy old and
frequently sub-code housing units. Since most low income families are
unable to own homes, we will concern ourselves here exclusively with
rental properties.
Acceptable housing is usually defined as that which meets minimum
6levels of habitability. Congress, in the Housing Act of 1964 defined a
minimum standard housing code as "related but not limited to health,
sanitation, and occupancy requirements." The boundaries of this "minimum"
code were outlined by the U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems
which recommended to Congress that housing code administration be used to
protect and maintain minimum housing standards affecting personal health,
safety, comfort and amenity in all areas of the city; prevent blight from
spreading to areas of standard quality housing; and upgrade basically
"minimum" in their requirements. "Minimum code housing" will refer
to housing which meets only minimal standards of health and safety.
"Maximum" or "optimal code standards" will refer to requirements which
prescribe levels of housing quality above this minimum level.
5 Ackerman, Regulating Seum Howsing Maatkert on Beha6 o6 the Poo't:
06 Houing Code, Housing Subsidies and Income 'is6tibution Poicy,
80 Yale Law Review 1093, 1117 (1971).
6 Housing Act o6 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-560, 78 Stat. 769, 785
(1968).
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sound and restorable "gray" areas. In accordance with these recommen-
dations, many municipalities began developing housing codes which
mandate far more than basic health and safety requirements and instead
attempt to further more ambitious social goals.
While some housing codes may be criticized for requiring standards
which bear little or no relationship to the public health or safety,
.others have been attacked on grounds that they are not stringent enough.
The U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems writes: "A house can meet
the legal standards set in a local code, pass a housing code inspection,
and still be unfit for human habitation by the personal standards of most
middle-class Americans."8
Our failure to reevaluate the efficacy of current housing codes
has allowed the perpetuation of an inconsistent and often illogical
set of housing regulations which have proven inadequate to either insure
minimum health and safety requirements or to upgrade the urban environment.
This paper will explore why existing housing codes cannot, under present
market conditions, achieve what they were designed to do and review
some alternative ways to correct the failures of the current system.
7U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems, Buidding the
AmeAican Cit., H.R. Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 296 (1968).
Id. at 274.
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II. ORIGIN OF HOUSING CODES
Since the beginning of communal living, man has sought to insulate
private property from government interference. However, man has also
recognized that the use of private property is not an absolute right and
that property should not be used to injure others or the community. 9
There is evidence that controls on the construction and use of
builjings existed as early as 5,000 years ago.10 The Pentateuch, the
first five books of the OMd Teotament, contains laws which govern "not
only man's relationship to God but also man's relationship to the
community including specific provisions with respect to health, safety
and sanitation."11 The first building code known to be recorded
appeared around 2,000 B.C. in the Code of Hammurabi, an early set of
Babylonian laws. Contained within that code were the following provisions:
Section 229: If a builder has built a house for a man and
his work is not strong, and if the house he has built falls
in and kills the householder, the builder shall be slain.
Section 230: If the child of the householder be killed,
the child of that builder shall be slain.
Section 231: If the slave of the householder be killed,
he shall give slave for slave to the householder.
12
90'Bannon, 6upta note 2, at 1.
1016 C.J.S. Constitutionat Law 209 (1956).
1 1 Taylor, A Guide 4o& Code Adoption and Code En6o'cement,
in Southern Building Magazine 3 [n.d.]
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O'Bannon, 6upta note 2, at 8.
Although current buildings codes do not carry with them such harsh
penalties, the construction and maintenance of unsafe buildings has
throughout history been viewed as a public crime.
9
Following the lead of the Babylonians, the Romans, under the
reign and guidance of Emperor Nero, developed a master plan which called
for sound construction and sanitation methods in the rebuilding efforts
which took place after the burning of Rome.
The Anglo-Saxon world also experienced an early development of
building regulations. In 1189 the Assize of Buildings, a document
governing building construction with particular concern for fire safety,
was enacted. Later, in response to the Great Fire of London which
destroyed nearly two-thirds of the city in 1666, Parliament enacted
the London Building Act which attempted to guide the rebuilding of the
city according to safety standards. Unfortunately, the inexperience of
code writers and the general nonenforcement of these new regulations
led to reconstruction in a manner which resembled the London which
existed prior to the fire. 1 3
Building regulations appeared in this country as early as 1625.
However, the size of the population at that time did not warrant
comprehensive building controls. . Instead, most of the early codes
-related to fire hazards such as wooden chimneys and thatched roofs.14
Following the devastating Chicago Fire of 1871, the development
of modern building codes received a major push. In addition to the
tremendous losses of life and property caused by the fire, the large
financial losses sustained by the insurance companies prompted an
13Id. at 2-3.
1 40'Bannon notes that it was not until 1862 when the population
reached 800,000 that building codes similar to those which now exist
were developed. Id. at 5.
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extensive campaign to enact building and fire codes. It is not unusual
therefore that one of the first model building codes in this country
was developed by the National Board of Fire Underwriters (now the
American Insurance Association) to aid cities in eliminating fire hazards.
The model code, published in 1905, was called the Recommended National
Building Code. This code was the forerunner of the modern building code
and still exists today, in revised form, as a continuing guide to fire
prevention as well as general building safety.1 5
The Recommended National Building Code was the only nationally
recognized model building code until 1927 when the Pacific Coast
Building Officials' Conference (now the International Conference of
Building Officials) published the Uniform Building Code which has been
used by west coast as well as east coast cities.16 From this beginning
has sprung other model building codes including the Southern Standard
Building Code developed in 1945 to serve primarily the southern states
and the Basic Building Code, published in 1950 by the Building Officials
Conference of America, which is used throughout the midwest and northeast.
Although the terms are often used interchangeably, building and
housing codes are not the same. Building codes relate to the regulation
of materials and methods in new construction to insure safety against
fire and avoid other structural hazards. In contrast, housing codes
are regulations which are applied to all housing to insure the maintenance
1 5Taylor, .6upLa note 11, at 3.
1 6 Landman, Ftexible Housing Code - The Mystique o4 the SingLe
Standatd: A Citicat Anatys6is and Compa.Aizon o4 Mode and Setected
Houwsing Codes Leading to the DeveLopment o6 a Popolsed ModeL FZexible
Housing Code, 18 Howard Law Journal 251, 257 (1974).
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and repair of existing housing in a manner which promotes health and
17
safety. Housing codes developed, in part, out of a recognition that
the durable nature of structures required on-going supervision to insure
that housing continued to meet health and safety requirements.
Housing codes did not take form in the United States until the
mid-nineteenth century. Prior to this time, the common law generally
relied on the private market to make adjustments in the level of housing
safety and protection. The traditional common law landlord-Lenant
relationship has its roots in the feudal land system under which a tenant
was obligated to the lord for the rents and profits of his labor on the
land even if the land ceased to be profitable for the tenant.18 From
this historical relationship sprung the doctrine of caveat emptor. This
doctrine provided that no warranties of habitability would be implied
into housing contracts. The tenant took the premises subject to any
patent defect, unless inspection was not possible, or to any latent
defect unknown to the landlord. Moreover, the duty to repair and
maintain the premises during the period of the lease usually rested
upon the lessee and his failure to carry out this duty subjected him to
1 70'Bannon distinguishes building and housing codes as follows:
"Building and construction codes are basically technical standards
dealing with inanimate objects. On the other hand, because housing
codes regulate how people may live, there are important social, economic,
cultural, and psychological aspects which pertain not only to the basic
standards, but also to the administration and application of the provi-
sions of the code." O'Bannon, Supta note 2, at 544.
1 8 Bross, Law Relorm Man Meets the Stumtotd: Inteaction o0
New Remedies and OZd Building in Housing Code Entotcement, 3 Urban
Lawyer 609, 609-610 (1971).
12
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liability for waste. Even when the landlord did make certain covenants
of repair and maintenance, such promises were considered to be
independent of the tenant's promise to pay rent. Therefore, a tenant was
obligated to continue rent payments even after the premises became
uninhabitable.2 0
Housing code enforcement readjusts the common law rights and
duties of both landlords and tenants. It allows government intervention
into the bargaining stage of the rental process, usually with the goal
of increasing tenant rights and landlord obligations. In general,
housing codes require the landlord to assume responsibility for repair
and maintenance while the tenant has a duty to keep the premises clean.
A landlord's duty to comply with housing code provisions is frequently
upheld even if the tenant has caused the violation.21 Not surprisingly,
the development of housing codes was resisted (and continues to be
opposed) by landlords who stood to benefit from the-traditional common
law relationship of landlord and tenant. Thus, most early attempts to
change housing conditions, especially for the indigent tenant who had no
bargaining power under the common law system, were made by private
individuals and philanthropic organizations. 2 2
1 9 Abbott, Housing PoYcle, Houing CodeA and Tenant Remedi:s:
An Integtation, 56 Boston University Law Review 1, 9 (1976).
2 0 Hirsch, A Study o6 the E66ects o6 the Legaf Environment on
LULban Housing Mavketa 7 (1975).
Id. at 8.
2 2For example, Jane Addams has been widely acclaimed for her work
in the slums of Chicago. Alice Griffith has a similar reputation for her
efforts to remove San Francisco's slums and Mary K. Simkhovich is known
13
One of the first housing laws in this country was enacted for New
York in response to the unsanitary and unsafe conditions which had
resulted from the proliferation of the tenement house. The Tenement
House Law, enacted in 1867 and amended in 1901, became a guide for other
cities interested in formulating health and safety regulations for exist-
ing housing. In 1914, the National Housing Association published the
Model Housing Law which provided a broader base for housing regulations
than did the 1901 law. 2 3
Federal involvement in the betterment of housing conditions began
when the U.S. Congress in 1892 commissioned a study of unsafe and unsani-
tary housing in American cities with populations over 200,000. Another
study conducted in 1920 explored the inadequacy of building regulations
and led to the formation of the Department of Commerce Building Code
Committee which published a series of eight reports that served as a
guide to local code preparation.24 It was not, however, until the mid-
thirties that the federal government became directly involved in the
problems of inadequate housing supply and substandard conditions. The
Great Depression forced the government into the business of financing
and constructing public housing and with this new federal role came the
creation of standards and criteria for both public and private housing.2 5
for her work in New York City. Authors Lawrence Veiller and Jacob Riis
were also instrumental in exposing the atrocities of slum housing to the
public. Landman, zup5ta 16, at 261.
23Id. at 263.
2 4O'Bannon, 6upa note 2, at 6-7.
2 5Parratt, Housing Code Adminitaton and, Endotcement at VIII (1970).
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The proclamation of the goal to provide "a decent and suitable
living environment for every American family" as contained within the
Housing Act of 194926 prompted a broadening of federal involvement in
urban problems to include slum clearance, urban redevelopment and the
financing of public housing. The Housing Act of 195427 repeated this
federal commitment and added direct incentives for the development of
housing codes. Under the Workable Program requirements of the 1954 Act,
federal assistance was contingent upon the formulation of a plan for
community development which was to include a program for the creation of
codes and code enforcement.
The 1960's brought about a realization that the urban renewal
programs of the previous decade had not been the panacea which many
expected. Thus, we experienced a policy shift away from a massive
razing and rebuilding effort to one of conservation and rehabilitation.
The monetary costs of clearance and redevelopment as well as the social
costs of displacement and relocation were believed to be avoidable under
28
the conservation policy articulated in the Housing Act of 19642. This
Act provided for the financing of intensive code enforcement programs
designed to eliminate the first stages of slums and blight and thus
prevent the need for subsequent clearance or rehabilitation. One year
later, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 196529 provided for
26Housing Act o6 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413 (1949).
27Housing Act o6 1954, Pub. L. No. 560, ch. 649, 68 Stat. 590 (1954).
2 8Landman, auptLa note 16, at 270.
29 Houing Act o6 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, 79 Stat. 451 (1965).
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extensive code enforcement to combat blight in declining areas of
American cities.
The Housing Acts of the past two decades have been successful in
encouraging the passage of municipal housing codes. In 1955 only 56
cities had housing codes but this figure increased to approximately
5,000 communities by 1968.30 More recently, the interest in housing
code enforcement has been generated not so much by a desire to eliminate
substandard housing as by the movement to revitalize central cities. Code
enforcement as an instrument of revitalization is aimed at reversing the
fiscal decline of central cities by attracting the middle class back into
the city. The Housing and Community Development Act of 197431 reshaped
the national housing goal "to encourage the preservation of existing
housing and neighborhoods through such measures as housing preservation,
moderate rehabilitation, and improvements in housing management and
maintenance in conjunction with the provision of adequate municipal
services."32 The goal of revitalization was reaffirmed three years later
in the Housing and Community Development Act of 197733 which recognized
the need to find ways to replenish declining urban tax bases.
3 0Although there is no tabulation today on the number of jurisdic-
tions which have housing codes, the trend of the past has probably
continued. Abbott, 6upka note 19, at 44.
31Housing and Comiuity Devetopment Act o6 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974).
Id. 801(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. 1441(c) (Supp. V 1975) (amending
42 U.S.C. 1441(a) (1970).
33Houzing and Comunity Development Act o6 1977, 42 U.S.C. 5301-
08, 5313, 5318 (West Supp. 1978).
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Paralleling this development of federal commitment to improving
housing conditions is an expansion of tenant rights by both courts and
legislatures. This modification of the traditional landlord-tenant
relationship in favor of new remedies for tenants is aimed at insuring
enforcement of minimum levels of housing quality. "Repair and deduct"
laws, rent withholding and abatement statutes, receivership laws and
retaliatory eviction and just-cause eviction statutes are an attempt to
give tenants new powers to enforce their rights under municipal housing
codes.34 The courts followed a similar trend by abandoning the common
law rule of caveat emptor in favor of implying a warranty of habitability
into rental contracts.35
3 4 Hirsch, 4upta note 20, at 2.
35Linctsey v. Notmet 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Javina v. Fi-At National
Reatty CoLpo.'iation 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), ceAt. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970).
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III. THE HOUSING CODE TODAY
Today, building problems are not basically different
from.those prevalent hundreds of years ago. They are
however, intensified by rapid population growth and
by the concentration of that population in urban areas.
The technical proficiency which makes the modern sky-
scraper possible also increases the potential for
casualty and the need for more comprehensive building
regulations.36
Modern housing codes37 serve two basic functions. First, housing
codes define the standards of health, safety, sanitation, light and
ventilation, maintenance, occupancy and fire protection which must be met
by each rental and owner-occupied dwelling unit. Generally, these codes
relate to three main areas of regulation:
(1) the supplied facilities in the structure (e.g., toilet,
bath, sink, stoves and radiators);
(2) the level of maintenance which includes both structural and
sanitary maintenance (e.g., structural maintenance includes
walls, ceilings, floors, roof, windows and staircases, while
sanitary maintenance relates to heat, hot and cold water,
sewage disposal and electricity); and
36
SO'Bannon, Zup La note 2, at 13.
3 7There are four major model housing codes used in the U.S. today
by local communities as guides to fulfill health and safety objectives.
These model codes are: (1) Uniform Housing Code (International Conference
of Building Officials); (2) Southern Standard Building Code Part IV:
Housing (Southern Building Code Conference); (3) Basic Housing Code
(Building Officials Conference of America, Inc.; (4) APHS-PHS Recommended
Housing Maintenance and Occupancy Ordinance (American Public Health
Association).
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(3) occupancy, which concerns the size of dwelling units and
rooms, the number of people who can occupy them and other
issues concerned with the usability and amenity of
interior space.38
And second, municipal housing laws contain the procedures and sanctions
for the enforcement of these standards. Generally, this component of
the housing code delineates the scope of the legislation by defining what
classes of structures fall within its reach. The statute must also out-
line the relative obligations of both landlords and tenants under the
code and provide penalties for the violation of such duties. Finally,
the code will generally include the administrative procedures to be
followed in carrying out the code.3 9
38U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems, Supta note 7, at 274.
3 9Guandolo, Houding Code in U/tban Renewat, in The Constitutionality
of Housing Codes 12 (1961).
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IV. THE ECONOMICS OF HOUSING CODE ENFORCEMENT
There are two different effects of housing code enforcement.
First, there is the housing effect. The goal is to provide better
housing at the real cost of doing so. Tenants pay an additional sum,
equivalent to the landlord's cost of providing code-improved housing.
Thus, the housing effect involves no net transfer of benefits from land-
lords to tenants.
In contrast, there is an income effect of housing code enforcement.
Implicit in this result is a transfer of income from the landlord who
pays for the code improvements to the tenant who enjoys the benefits
thereof without an increase in rent. In this manner, housing code
enforcement becomes a type of in-kind subsidy in the form of coerced
action by landlords. If this result can in fact be achieved, it is
justified by a belief that landlords are better able to bear the costs of
providing habitable housing than their tenants. 40 Housing codes are thus
a means of enforcing the private subsidization of increased housing
consumption.
There is much debate as to whether the enforcement of modern
housing codes leads to a housing or an income effect. The opponents of
housing code regulations claim that an income effect is not possible.
Instead, these critics claim that code enforcement leads to a variety of
problems including higher rents, disinvestment and abandonment. This
next section will analyze three studies which attempt to explain the
40 Javins v. Fit Naton. Reattyi Copoa~ton, 4pL note 35, at 1079.
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economic impact which housing codes have upon the supply and price of
housing. The first two studies by Ackerman41 and Komesar42 are theoretical
43in approach while the third by Hirsch and Margolis is empirical. The
assumptions drawn in each of these studies and the results reached are
very different. Thus, it is still unclear what impact housing code
enforcement actually has upon housing markets. However, one feature is
common to all three of these studies: Each makes the critical assumption
that comprehensive code enforcement is possible. Yet observance of the
real world shows that such an assumption could not be further from the
trut h.
A. THE ACKERMAN MODEL
The most detailed of the recent studies on the market impact of
housing code enforcement is offered by Ackerman. Within this study,
Ackerman details short run supply and demand reactions under two different
market conditions. Beginning with a basic set of assumptions, 4
4 1 Ackerman, supta note 5 [hereinafter cited as Ackeman ].
42 Koesar, Retuwn to Stumvi!Ae: A CLUttque o6 the Ackituan
AnaLgjl6 oj Housing Code Enoncement and the Pook, 83 Yale Law Journal
1175 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Komneza].
4 3Hirsch and IMargolis, Hlabitab.ility Laws and Low Cost Housing, in
Residential Location and Urban Housing Markets (G.K. Ingram ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Hi4,Uoch and Mcagol] .
4 4 For purposes of his model, Ackerman makes the following basic
assumptions: (1) both landlords and tenants are rational and act to
promote their own interests; (2) the market for rental housing is a
competitive one; (3) tenants operate in a market in which information of
price and quality is freely available; (4) all units in the affected
neighborhood are of equal substandardness; (5) all tenants create equal
amounts of damage to the units which they occupy; and (6) there is no
significant amount of immigration or out-migration occurring within the
community or its hinterland. Ackerman, Sup!,a note 5, at 1102-3.
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Ackerman models the impact of code enforcement in an environment in which
the supply of housing is perfectly inelastic. Ackerman then modifies
this model to allow for the removal of some units from the market through
either abandonment or conversion. Finally, he includes some other
elements to further illustrate the reaction of the market to various non-
market forces. These refinements demonstrate how greatly Ackerman's
first model deviates from reality.
1. Inelastic Supply Conditions
Ackerman assumes that, under inelastic supply conditions, landlords
will not remove their properties from the marlet when the costs of code
45
improvement are imposed. ~le then concludes that a comprehensive code
enforcement program will not cause tenants to move since they will bc on
better off by moving when, after code enforcemien L , a Ihousi ng within the
area is of the same quality. Rents will therefore rerai*n at pre-code
enforcement levels. This result is possible according ao Ackerman
because increased demand for code-improved will not be created.
Landlords who attempt to pass the costs of code improvement on to
their tenants will be unsuccessful because, within the community, there
exists a class of tenants who believe that code enforcement will not
significantly improve their lives. Consequently, in the wake of higher
rents, these "lukewarm" residents will double up their occupancy of units
45
Underlying this general assumption is the belief that: (1) the
rate of return on each rental property will exceed its return if used for
purposes other than housing; (2) the imposition of code enforcement costs
will not alter the relative economic advantage o the use- of the property
as residential as compared with other non-residential uses; and (3) code
enforcement costs will not cause abandonment to become an economically
preferred alternative. Ackerman, 6upta note 5, at 1103.
22
46 The reaction of theseor move to areas where the rents are cheaper.
"lukewarm" residents to higher rents will produce a decline in occupancy,
thereby forcing landlords to either reduce rents to pre-code levels or
suffer high vacancy rates.
Ackerman's conclusion that code enforcement will not raise rents
within a market with an inelastic supply is thus contingent upon the
existence of two very critical elements: (1) a significant number of
"lukewarm" families who are not willing to pay higher rents for code-
improved units; and (2) a comprehensively enforced code program within
the community.47
Where comprehensive code enforcement is not possible, Ackerman
envisions a shift of renters from improved housing to unimproved housing
4 6 It is questionable whether this "doubling up" effect is a
realistic response to code enforcement, and Ackerman presents no empirical
evidence to support his reliance on this theory. In situations involving
families, it is not clear whether doubling up is a legal, feasible or
desirable alternative to relocation. Similarly, with regard to single
individuals whose mobility is frequently greater than that of families,
there is no indication that they would elect to double up rather than
relocate.
4 7Ackerman's first assumption poses an important question: If
there are a significant number of families who do not value code-improved
units and who are unable or unwilling to pay for them, why is code
enforcement imposed in the first place? From a purely cost-benefit
perspectiv'e, code improvement of units occupied by such tenants does not
seem correct. Thus, Ackerman may be suggesting that code improvement is
necessary in such situations for health and safety reasons regardless of
the harmful economic results such a policy would have on those it is
intended to benefit.
The existence of a significant number of families who do not value
code improvement perhaps strengthens the argument for the imposition of
selective code enforcement. Under this scheme, codes would be enforced
only to the extent that there are tenants who are willing and able to pay
for the increased costs of code improvements.
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and vice versa according to ability to pay. As a result, there will be
some rent hikes in improved housing when landlords are able to demand
higher rents as the competition for such units increases. 4 8
Although selective code enforcement can lead to higher rents within
an inelastic supply market, Ackerman suggests that this method should not
be totally disregarded as a tool for redistributing income since its
impact on rent levels is a function of the ratio between the code
enforcement area and the entire housing area. He reasons that the
smaller the code enforcement area is relative to the entire slum area the
greater is the probable impact on overall rent levels in the housing area.
This conclusion is reached because, under such circumstances, it will not
be difficult for landlords to find enough families to pay the increased
rents of the improved area. In contrast, where there are more code-
improved units than there are tenants who are willing to pay for them,
landlords will be forced to keep their rents down in competition for the
limited number of tenants.
2. Elastic Supply Conditions
Ackerman modifies his first market situation so that some units
are withdrawn from the market. Here, code enforcement will reduce the
rate of return on some buildings to the point where these landlords will
abandon their properties or convert them to some other use. Many of the
dwelling units which are abandoned or converted as a result of code
enforcement are those which were formerly occupied by low income tenants.
4 8This result ofcourse requires that the number of renters seeking
code-improved properties exceeds the number of such units on the
market.
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Thus, a reduction in the supply of low income housing causes an increase
in competition for those units which remain and which are still affordable
by the low income renter. Those who are unable to pay the higher rents
induced by an increased demand for these remaining units are forced to
double up their occupancy. This involuntary doubling up causes
overcrowding and thus the condition of low income tenants as a whole is
worsened by code enforcement.4 9
Ackerman suggests that the impact of comprehensive code
enforcement under relatively elastic supply conditions may be moderated
to some degree by the "trickling down" to the poor of housing occupied
by lower-middle income groups. Lower-middle income families move
into homes once occupied by the rich who in turn have moved into
newly constructed units. Assuming that units that have "trickled down"
are equal in number to units that have been withdrawn from the market,
rents will not rise unless a portion of the community feels that the
'trickled down" housing is better housing and are willing to pay for
this additional quality. In contrast, if the number of "trickled down"
units is not sufficient to replace the units removed from the market
through abandonment or conversion, a shortage will exist and we are
again in a rising-rents situation. Ackerman suggests that in this
latter case, government subsidization of the low income housing market
is necessary before we can expect to maintain a comprehensive
code enforcement program which does not create rent increases for this
49
Moving to lower priced sub-code housing is not an available
alternative here since code enforcement is presumed to be area-wide and
therefore no such units exist.
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segment of the housing market. 5 0
From the above analysis, the conclusion that Ackerman reaches is
that comprehensive code enforcement will not prevent rising rents unless
government subsidization is available. Ackerman himself recommends that
without such a subsidization program selective enforcement may be the
"optimal strategy". Selective enforcement allows for the application of
code enforcement only in areas where such enforcement will not affect
profitability in a way that forces units to be withdrawn from the market.
3. Non-Market Considerations
To more closely approximate the real world, Ackerman removes the
assumption that all of the area's housing is of equal quality before
code enforcement. Ackerman suggests that the result of comprehensive
code enforcement in the above situation is to raise all sub-code housing
to code standards. Thus, through code enforcement, a sub-code unit
formerly renting at $60 will be in parity with a sub-code unit formerly
renting at $100.
Ackerman argues that comprehensive code enforcement will force
rents in the $100 unit down to $60 since tenants can now pay $60 for the
5 0Ackerman asserts that such a subsidization program must consist
of the government making up the difference between the number of units
removed from the market and the number of units "trickled down".
Ackerman, Supta note 5, at 1097-8, 1115-19.
Within his article, Ackerman compares the redistributive impact
of code enforcement when supported by a direct housing subsidy with
the redistribution potential of a negative income tax plan. He
concludes that a direct housing code enforcement subsidy is preferable,
with respect to its benefits for low income tenants, to expenditures
of the same amount on a negative income tax plan.
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same quality unit which was formerly renting at $100. Assuming that
tenants do not yield to collusive attempts by landlords to raise rents
after code enforcement, competition for the $60 units will force rents
to decline from $100 to $60 in the former $100 units.
Ackerman complicates matters by adding non-housing amenities such
as better transportation, superior education and improved access to
recreational and commercial facilities. With the imposition of code
enforcement, rents in areas offering superior neighborhood amenities will
decline relative to rents existing in areas lacking such amenities to the
extent that residents in the former areas find that $60 rents are more
attractive than the amenities which such areas offer. Conversely,
residents in non-amenity areas may be willing to pay more rent for better
community facilities and will therefore move to the amenity areas. An
equilibrium will be reached when the number of amenity area residents
who double up occupancy or move to the non-amenity area equals the number
of non-amenity area residents who choose to move to the amenity area.
Rents in the $100 amenity area will continue to fall until this
equilibrium is reached.5 1
Rents in the $60 unit will increase according to Ackerman only
where the $100 unit area is inferior to the $60 unit area with respect
to non-housing amenities. In such a situation, residents in the $100
units improved by code enforcement would be willing to move to the area
5 1Rents will not fall below $60 however, and if they do fall as low
as $60 this decline simply means that not enough amenity area and non-
amenity area residents value neighborhood amenities as greatly as low rents.
The $60 non-amenity area rent will not change provided that a signi-
ficant number of $60 residents are indifferent to code improvements.
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with $60 rents and better amenities. Existing $60 unit tenants,
obtaining a good deal for their money, will be unwilling to move until
competition for such units raises the rents to a level which the $60
unit renters can no longer afford. The extent to which $60 unit rents
will rise is a function of how greatly residents in both areas value
non-housing amenities. The greater the influx of non-amenity $100 renters
into the $60 area, the higher rents will rise in the latter. Rents in
the former $100 area will decline as $60 residents who were displaced by
rent increases move to the vacant $100 units but will be unwilling to
pay $100 for such units. Ackerman summarizes the results of this
latter situation as follows:
It would appear, then that in this last, most compli-
cated and least likely case, comprehensive code
enforcement will induce rents in [ the $60 area] to
increase beyond [that] level and may indeed generate
a rent level exceeding $100 if enough [ ex-$100 renters]
and old time [$60 renters ] value living in [the
amenity area] very highly; in the meantime, rents will
plummet in [the $100 area ] from $100 to something
below $60 if there are a significant number of families
among those emigrating from [ the $60 area] who are luke-
warm about code enforcement.52
Thus, where the aggregate decline in the $100 area exceeds the aggregate
increase in the $60 area, code enforcement will cause an overall decline
in rents. However, overall rents will tend to increase where the
reverse is true.
B. THE KOMESAR MODEL
Komesar takes a long run approach in an attempt to explain the
impact of code enforcement on the supply of housing. In his severely
5 2Ackerman, 6upaLa note 5, at 1137.
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critical analysis of the Ackerman short run, inelastic supply model,
Komesar asserts that housing supply is not fixed over time. Instead,
rental housing, like all structures, will deteriorate over time. Thus,
at some point each structure will require either rehabilitation or
reconstruction. When units are no longer habitable, some will be
removed from the market if the cost of improvement or reconstruction
exceeds the return on the rehabilitation or rebuilding investment. 5 3
Komesar concludes: "Thus, even if the immediate supply of rental units
is constant, the supply will not remain constant as time passes, and its
rate of change will depend on the costs of continued operation including
those associated with code enforcement.54
Komesar's observation of a long run elasticity for housing supply
leads him to conclude that the imposition of code enforcement will cause
a significant number of landlords to abandon their properties. Removal
of units from the low income housing market will continue until the
increased demand for the remaining units pushes rents up high enough to
cover the increased cost of improvement.
Housing abandonment however is only the most immediate result of
code enforcement. Komesar believes that code enforcement may also
affect the supply of low income housing by imposing increased costs
5 3 Code enforcement has the- effect of speeding up the date at
which such an investment must be made. Many structures may be in
habitable condition but may not meet minimal code requirements. Thus,
a landlord will be forced to make code improvements, or remove the
property from the market, prior to the time in which he might otherwise
have made such a decision in the absence of code enforcement.
5 4Komesar, .6upLa note 42, at 1187.
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on the construction of low income housing.55 Similarly, the increased
cost of constructing high income housing will have an indirect impact on
the supply of housing for the poor through its limitation on the "trick-
ling down" of deteriorated units from the rich to the poor. Komesar
finally asserts that the long run supply of housing can be further
reduced by the in-migration of lower-middle income families who are
attracted to the community's newly code-improved housing.
All of these long run impacts were ignored or summarily dismissed
by Ackerman. In Komesar's view, such impacts have a crucial affect on
the long run supply of housing. Examination of these long run reactions
to code enforcement leads him to conclude that, at least in the long run,
code enforcement causes a reduction in housing supply which in turn can
only lead to higher rents.56
C. THE HIRSCH AND MARGOLIS MODEL
Hirsch and Margolis offer a detailed analysis of the impact of
specific types of code enforcement programs (termed "habitability laws" 5 7
by the authors) on the cost of rental housing. Within their study,
5 5Komesar asserts that code enforcement creates additional costs
for the low income housing developer at both the construction stage and
later at the maintenance stage. Unlike Ackerman, he believes that the
investor calculates these present and future costs into his projection
of the profitability of low income housing construction. Komesar,
6upta note 42, at 1188-90.
5 6Increased demand caused by in-migration of those attracted to
newly code-improved housing is included within this analysis since its
impact on the housing market, i.e., creation -of a housing shortage, is
the same as when the housing supply itself is reduced.
5 7Although "habitability laws" may not be perfectly synonymous
with "code enforcement" since some laws within the former category are
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Hirsch and Margolis stress the passage of time as the most important
determinant of the market's reaction to housing code enforcement.
Like Komesar, Hirsch and Margolis criticize the short run approach
taken by Ackerman. They contend that Ackerman's first model, which assumes
that no units will be taken off the market as a result of code enforcement,
"begs the question" since "if we assume no possible reaction by landlords,
we have no trouble concluding that the landlords' reactions will not lead
to higher rents."58 Yet Hirsch and Margolis also criticize Komesar's
long run model. They argue that Komesar's world of almost complete
elasticity ignores the peculiar durability of the housing stock: 59
Although conditions may render provision of housing
a less profitable activity than expected at the
time the building was constreuted, its alternative
uses may be quite limited, due to the particular
attributes of its structure and location. There-
fore, many units will remain in service even though
net revenues have been reduced. 60
not directly concerned with- bringing each dwelling unit up to code
standards, the aim of habitability laws, like code enforcement, is to
insure that all units meet minimum levels of quality and therefore the
two terms will be used interchangeably for purposes of this paper.
The Hirsch and Margolis study includes repair and rent deduct laws,
receivership, rent withholding laws and statutes forbidding retaliatory
evictions against tenants who seek to enforce their right to housing
which complies with code requirements.
5 8Hirsch and Margolis, Supa note 43, at 188.
5 9 Due to the durability of the housing stock, net revenues from
residential use may continue to exceed the opportunity cost of maintaining
the property in that use even though conditions result in revenues lower
than those previously anticipated. Ofcourse the impacts of durability
disappear in the extreme long run. Hirsch, LupLa note 20, at 30-31.
6 0 Hirsch, Hirsch and Margolis, RegnLeSion Analtyis o6 the Edecta
o4 HabitabiLity Laws Upon Rent: An Empixicat Ob4etvation on the
Acke-man-Kome5aL Debate, 63 California Law Review 1098, 1117 (1975)
(footnote omitted).
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Hirsch and Margolis reject both the short and long run perspectives
in favor of their own "quasi-long run" approach which attempts to describe
a housing market in which landlords are free to manipulate either the
61
quantity or quality of housing services but not to change the number
of housing units supplied. The authors find that differences in the
supply and demand for housing account for a large degree of the variation
in housing expenditures. However, they are not directly concerned with
price. Instead, they believe that the amount of housing service which
will be provided, given a particular set of supply and demand conditions,
will lead to a determination of the relative value consumers place on such
housing characteristics. 62
1. On the Demand Side
Hirsch and Margolis begin by assuming that information regarding
market prices and varying quantities of housing service is not freely
available to the consumer. Therefore, renters are not able to maximize
the use of their rental dollars within a given budget constraint. Given
this assumption, they formulate an equation that enables them to target
"the solution to the choice of housing service . . .[ at the]point at
which the household's marginal rate of substitution for housing and other
expenditures is equal to the bid value for an addtional value unit of
6 1 Hirsch and Margolis define "housing quality"' as the aggregate
amount of housing service which comprises all the characteristics of a
particular dwelling unit (e.g., size, location, plumbing, etc.). Thus,
the decision by a landlord to provide high or low quality in a
particular dwelling unit is equivalent to the decision to provide more or
less housing service." Hirsch and Margolis, 4uptwa note 43, at 191-2.-
62 id.
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housing.63 In other words, a consumer equilibrium is reached where a
household's willingness to pay for increased housing services is equal
to the price, "bid value", of these additional services. As Hirsch and
Margolis explain:
Within the above setting, we regard the household's
decisionmaking process as moving along an indifference
curve as it exchanges housing services for nonhousing
consumption. Doing so, the household pays according
to its marginal rate of substitution of housing for
other expenditures for each successive unit of housing
service.64
2. On the Supply Side
On the supply side, a similar explanation is offered. As
consumers reach an equilibrium where their willingness to pay for an
additional unit of housing service equals the cost of obtaining such
services, a supplier will also reach equilibrium where the marginal cost
of producing that additional unit of housing service equals the marginal
gain (price) he will receive for his efforts.
3. Empirical Findings
Using this theoretical framework as background, Hirsch and
Margolis provide an empirical evaluation of the impact of various
habitability laws on the housing market. The study includes repair and
rent deduction laws, receivership, and rent withholding laws combined
with statutes forbidding retaliatory evictions against tenants who
attempt to enforce code compliance within the units they rent. Such
63Id. at 194.
Id. at 195.
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laws reflect the wide variety of methods presently employed to combat
the problem of substandard housing.
Utilizing housing characteristic and household description data
taken primarily from the University of Michigan Panel of Income Dynamics.
(1972), a least squares regression model estimate is developed which
relates rents to subsets of independent variables65 for 154 observations
in fifty SMSA's.
Among the various habitability laws studied, only under receiver-
ship laws were rents significantly higher than they were in the absence
of regulation.66 The lack of rent increases under other habitability
laws can be interpreted as meaning that either landlords could not pass
cost increases on to tenants or chose to bear the entire cost burden
themselves. 6 7
Hirsch and Margolis attribute this result, in part, to the nature
of the receivership process by which the state or local government seizes
the property of a landlord who has failed to comply with code requirements.
All rents to the landlord are stopped and the government takes control of
the repair process. This system of direct government code enforcement
has two unique characteristics which are not present in the other two
65See: Table 1, p. 35.
Note that statistical tests cannot determine causal relationships
but merely show that a correlation between habitability laws and higher
rents exists. Hirsch, SuptLa note 20, at 50.
66,
"[R]ents in states with receivership laws were on average about
12 percent higher than those without such laws." Id. at 58.
6 7fHirsch asserts that this latter possibility is not likely.
Id. at 50.
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TABLE 1
Below is a table on the Description and Source of Variables used
in the Hirsch and Margolis study.
Description Source
Sum of annual household rent plus utilities
paid in 1972
Number of rooms in the dwelling
Distance of housing structure to the
center of the SMSA
Structural type
Average household income for a five-year
period, 1968-1972
Average lot value of equivalent sites
in SMSAs
Ratio: tenth percentile rental unit price
to median rental unit price
Median SMSA household income for renters
Total per capita income for the SMSA
Costs of construction for brick-concrete
apartments across cities
Average annual heating cost per room for
rental units in an SMSA
Identifies states with repair and deduct
housing laws
Identifies states with both retaliatory
eviction and withholding laws
Identifies states with receivership laws
Number of vacancies below median divided
b'y number of low-income renters
Property tax per household, average for
the SMSA
Number of low-iincone tenants in the SMSA
1972 Michigan
survey
-Do.--
-Do.-
-Do.-
1968-72 Michigan
survey
FHIA (1973)
Census (1970)
Census (1970)
-Do.-
1972 Boeckh
index
Apartment building
income, expense
analysis (IR EM 1972)
lirsch et al. (1975)
-Do.-
-Do.--
Census (1970)
Census (1970)
Cens 1970)
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categories of habitability laws explored by Hirsch and Margolis. First,
receivership generally places the control of initiation in the government
rather than the tenant and thus subjects enforcement to the risk of being
exercised in a manner which contravenes the best interests of the
tenant.68 Secondly, because repairs are made by the government, they are
often made without regard to cost. Thus, landlords frequently incur
greater costs which are passed on to the tenant under this approach than
under other habitability laws which force the landlords to make the
necessary repairs themselves at potentially less cost.
These statistical results show that "merely extending tenants'
legal rights of action and thereby shifting some of the power away from
landlords may not in fact enhance the tenants' welfare. The cost of
providing habitable housing must be borne by someone. There is evidence
that the cost imposed by receivership laws appears to be largely borne
by tenants without their receiving fully compensating benefits." 6 9
D. CONCLUSION
We are thus confronted with three divergent views regarding the
impact of housing code enforcement on housing prices. Ackerman concludes
that the increased costs of code enforcement cannot be passed on to
tenants in the form of higher rents. In contrast, Komesar finds that code
enforcement reduces the amount of affordable housing for low income
6 8Hirsch points out that "[r]ecently, a number of states have
granted standing to tenants to initiate receiverships of the buildings
where they reside." Id. at 22 (footnote omitted).
69Hirsch and Margolis, 4apAa note 43, at 209.
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renters and thus increases rents in those units which remain. Hirsch
and Margolis shown that at least one type of code enforcement program,
receivership, raises rents.
Of the three conclusions, the Ackerman approach appears to be
clearly erroneous in light of the other two analyses. Ackerman's
assumption of a perfectly inelastic supply curve so dramatically departs
from reality as to draw question to the accuracy of his conclusion.
Regarding Ackerman's assumption, Hirsch, Hirsch and Margolis express the
following reservation.
Although Ackerman's assumption of a perfectly inelastic
supply of dwellings may be appropriate in the extreme
short run, it is contradicted by both empirical evidence
and the theories of supply of low income housing that
have been advanced by economists.70
Ackerman sets up his own conclusion by the unrealistic assumptions which
he makes in his first example. Although the assumptions in his second
example may be more realistic, the conclusion he reaches is contrary to
his hypothesis. That is, Ackerman finds that under elastic supply
conditions comprehensive code enforcement leads to higher rents.
The Ackerman model is also incorrect in its assumption that
comprehensive code enforcement is available. According to the Ackerman
model, even given an inelastic supply situation, rents will increase
unless comprehensive code enforcement is available. Ackerman admits that
selective enforcement will lead to an increase in rents and he is further
forced to concede that low income rents will rise when code enforcement is
implemented within an elastic market. The Komesar and Hirsch and Margolis
70Hirsch, Hirsch and Margolis, 6apAa note 60, at 1116 (footnote omitted).
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studies are equally flawed in their failure to recognize the difficulty,
if not present impossibility, of comprehensive code enforcement given
the current legal, administrative and economic climate of most localities
which are burdened with the task of code enforcement.
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V. OBSTACLES TO COMPREHENSIVE CODE ENFORCEMENT
A. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
The enforcement of housing codes is a recognized component of the
police power. The 10th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reserves
this power to the states. Thus, the power of a municipality to enact and
enforce housing codes is granted only through a delegation of this state
poli:e power to the locality via statute, constitutional provision or
charter.71 Under this broad power, private property rights may be
limited, restricted or impaired to promote the general welfare of the
community.72 This concept of general welfare is not limited to matters
concerning the mere protection of health and safety but instead has been
used to validate a number of municipal regulations aimed at promoting
public morals and the general well-being of the community.73 Given
this broad definition of general welfare, the constitutionality of a
wide variety of housing laws has been upheld.7 4
Claims that housing codes are ultra vires (beyond the power of
the municipality to enact) and the argument that officials lack delegated
7 1Guandolo, 6uptLa note 39, at 16.
7216 C.J.S. CondLtutional Law 209 (1956).
7 3Guandolo, 6upka note 39, at 17.
7 4Guandolo suggests that "the infringement of property rights
through the enforcement of housing codes will be governed not so much by
the rule of precedent as by judicial cognizance of existing urban
conditions and judicial deference to 'the strong and preponderant
opinion' as to what is 'greatly and immediately necessary to the public
welfare'." Id. at 18.
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power to enact specific code standards have generally been unsuccessful.7 5
However, as an exercise of the police power such regulations are subject
to the same constitutional limitations imposed on the police power
generally. Thus, each housing regulation must bear a reasonable
relationship to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.
Although a presumption of validity may attach to a specific housing code
requirement, such a presumption may be rebutted by a showing that the law
bears no reasonable relationship to the public goals sought to be
accomplished through the statute.76
The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment further limits
the scope of the police power. This clause requires that the regulation
be applied equally to all property or persons similarly situated. Even
when a housing code properly promotes the general health or safety of the
community, it may be invalidated where it is applied arbitrarily to only
certain persons or properties or where the result of enforcement is an
unreasonable discrimination among such groups. This limitation does not
however prohibit the application of different rules to different classes
of persons or property. The equal protection clause merely requires that
the classification be based on reasonable distinctions in light of the
public goals sought to be achieved and that there is uniform application
78
of the law among members of the same general class. Similarly, mere
75Grad, New Sanctions and Remedins in Housing Code En~otcement,
3 Urban Lawyer 577, 578 (1971).
76Guandolo, 6upta note 39, at 21.
7716 C.J.S. Contitutionat Law 493 (1956).
7882 C.J.S. Statutn 162 (1956).
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inequalities in result among persons or properties within a class will
not alone invoke questions of equal protection. Some class members may
be benefited or harmed more than others within that same class by the
application of a particular regulation without violating the equal
protection clause.
Challenges to specific housing code provisions on equal protection
grounds have been particularly successful with respect to occupancy
standards. For example, in Ballef v. Peopte, 190 Ill. 28, 60 N.E. 98
(1901), a housing code provision which restricted the number of
occupants per room was invalidated on grounds that it discriminatorily
applied only to lodging facilities and not to other types of hotels or
rooming houses. 8 0
Housing code enforcement is also limited by considerations of
both procedural and substantive due process. The procedural aspects of
due process require that those subject to regulation under a housing
code be afforded proper protections with respect to notice, hearings,
appeals, summary proceedings and similar procedural formalities.81 It is
however the inspection portion of the enforcement process which has caused
the courts the most trouble.
Housing code inspections require the entry of officials into both
interior and exterior areas of a property which poses serious questions
of due process. After several years of confusion and contradiction over
79id
80See atso: State v. McComLck 120 Minn. 97, 138 N.W. 1032 (1912),
and BMennan v. Mt-waukee 265 Wis. 52, 60 N.W.2d 704 (1953).
8 1 Guandolo, ZupWa note 39, at 24.
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the issue in both the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower courts,82 the
U.S. Supreme Court in Camaka v. MuiLcipa Cout o6 the City o6 San
FVancizco, 387 U.S.523 (1967), laid to rest the question of whether a
housing code inspection constitutes an unlawful search. In Camata, the
Court, in balancing the 4th Amendment considerations inherent in the code
enforcement process with the need to insure safe and habitable housing,
decided in favor of protecting the rights of individuals to privacy and
security as guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, the warrantless code
enforcement search was deemed unconstitutional and consent by either the
landlord or tenant is now required before any warrantless search can be
upheld.83 Although the search warrant requirement represents a further
step which must be taken before code enforcement can be achieved, it
may not present a serious obstacle since, in most cases, consent is given
without opposition and thus a warrant is not necessary.84
Finally, housing code enforcement may give rise to substantive
due process problems concerning the taking of property without just
82See, e.g.,: Givne v. Maygcand 210 Md. 506, 124 A.2d 764 (1956);
Little v. Diztnict o6 Cowmbia 62 A.2d 875 (1948), a6d'd, 178 F.2d 13
(1949), add'd, 339 U.S. 1 (1950); and F/ank v. MaAqgand 359 U.S. 380
(1959).
8 3Tenant approval to the search is required where inspectors wish
to enter an individual apartment and evidence of code violations
discovered through tenant consent may be used against the landlord.
Landman, Zupaa note 16, at 302.
Note also that the Camata Court ruled that the showing of "probable
cause" required for the issuance of a housing inspection search warrant
is less strict than that required for a criminal investigation warrant.
387 U.S. 523, 538-9.
8 4 Landman, 6up La note 16, at 304.
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compensation. The 14th Amendment prohibits a severe restriction of use
or the complete taking of private property for public purposes without
compensation to the owner. There is no question that this protection
exists where the power of eminent domain is exercised. It is less clear
whether a property owner who suffers a similar loss under the police
power is afforded the same constitutional protection. Generally,
"compensation is not required for the deprivation of private property
or the impairment of its value or usefulness resulting from the lawful
exercise of the police power in the enforcement of a housing code" even
though a property owner subjected to housing code enforcement may be
deprived of his property to an extent equivalent to a loss of property
occasioned by an exercise of the power of eminent domain.85 Housing code
enforcement may require extensive, yet uncompensable, actions ranging
from major repairs to complete demolition. 8 6
Several explanations have been offered in an attempt to reconcile
the different treatment of losses created by the police power and the
power of eminent domain. It has been suggested that the distinction
lies in the fact that code enforcement is applied uniformly within a
85RichAds v.City o4 Columbia 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683, 690
(1955); Guandolo, SupLta note 39, at 27.
8 6 For example, frequently demolition will be ordered where the
cost of repairs exceeds 50% of the replacement cost. The validity
of such an action as an exercise of the police power has been upheld and
thus no compensation is afforded the property owner. See: Peteptetchi-
kodd v. City o4 Lo6 Angelte 174 Cal. App.2d 697, 345 P.2d 261 (1959);
Spatingiietd v. City o6 Little Rock 226 Ark. 462, 290 S.W.2d 620 (1956);
and Fordham and Upson, Contitutionat ztatus o4 Housing Codes and
Retated Measwtes, in The Constitutionality of Housing Codes 65
(1961).
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designated area while the power of eminent domain is exercised only on
a selective basis. It has been further suggested that the difference
lies in the ultimate purpose of the exercise of such public powers. In
the first instance, the power of eminent domain is exercised so that
private property may be converted into public uses. In contrast, the
exercise of the police power through code enforcement merely removes a
public nuisance and does not transfer private property into public hands.
As Justice Holmes suggested in PennSyfvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922), the distinction may merely be one of degree. The idea is
that regulations may result in uncompensable losses under the police
power where a legitimate public purpose is shown. However, where the
public purpose does not support such severe losses of private property,
the power of eminent domain may be utilized to carry out such purposes
but compensation must be provided to prevent unfair burdens on
individuals for the benefit of the community. 8 7
More recent cases have attempted to temper the harsh results
created by the application of the police power. The courts have
generally approached this problem by focusing on the reasonableness of
the relationship between the purpose sought to be promoted by the
regulation and the ability of the regulation to carry out such goals.
Included within this calculus is a consideration of the cost such a law
would impose on the individual property owner. Where the cost exceeds
the benefits or where enforcement costs create adverse impacts such as
abandonment or conversion, several courts have ruled in favor of a
8 7Guandolo, Supta note 39, at 28-9.
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relaxation of strict code enforcement. The courts have been most
willing to yield to the economic realities of the housing market in
situations where the code requirements sought to be enforced relate to
conditions which are concered primarily with physical, rather than
health or safety, aspects of a particular unit. For example, in
striking down an order to repair torn wallpaper and cracked windows, the
court in Apple v. City and County oA Denvet, 154 Colo. 166, 390 P.2d 91
(1964), acknowledged that although economic hardship alone is not
sufficient to invalidate a law, the ordinance "must, in its application
to the specific property, be such as not to be an unreasonable demand
upon the individual for the benefit of the public welfare."88 Similarly,
the cost of compliance may be determinative in the invalidation of a
housing code requirement where the court cannot find that the continued
use of the property without repairs would "immediately and directly
imperil the public health, safety or morals." 8 9
A few courts have even refused to grant protection to certain hot
88390 P.2d 9., 95.
89Gates Co. v. Howsing Appeats Bd. o6 City o6 Columbus 10 Ohio
St.2d 48, 225 N.E.2d 222, 225 (1967). Here, the court held that a
landlord did not have to construct additional bathrooms as required by
the housing code where noncompliance fines would exceed $9,000 annually
and the cost of compliance would be greater than 50% of the fair market
value of the property before improvement.
But cA.: Rubin v. Hervo Reatty CoPpotation, 84 Misc.2d 1074, 376
N.Y.S.2d 834 (1975), where the court did not compel a landlord to correct
and repair electrical violations which constituted immediate hazards to
life, health and safety since the cost of such repairs would exceed
$1,250,000. The court did however demand that the landlord pay to the
tenants amounts representing reasonable relocation costs incurred as
a result of discontinuance of electrical service within the apartment
building by the city.
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water and bathroom ordinances where the cost of compliance would present
a serious hardship to the landlord.90 In such cases, the courts have
struck down housing laws requiring the installation of bathrooms and hot
water heaters on grounds that such a requirement as applied to the
defendant-landlord was an unconstitutional deprivation of property without
compensation. This result has been reached on grounds that the regulations
bore no substantial or reasonable relation to the public health, welfare
or safety. In all of these cases, each court relied heavily upon the
economic hardship which enforcement would impose upon landlords and the
concomitant rent increases for tenants, resulting in "vacancies, vandalism
and probably a total loss of the buildings." However, both the
reasoning and the results of such decisions have been severely criticized.
Critics feel that the courts' reliance, in striking down these laws, on
arguments concerning the severe economic hardship of code enforcement may
encourage landlords to contest a variety of housing-code standards on
similar grounds of landlord hardship or discourage the enforcement of
comparable laws by municipal officials. 9 2
B. THE INADEQUACY OF ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
Although a variety of code enforcement mechanisms exist such as
See: Dente v. At. VeCnon 50 Misc.2d 983, 272 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1966);
SadeA v City o6 Jacksonvl~Le 237 So.2d 8 (1970); City o6 St. Louis v.
BMune 515 S.W.2d 471 (1974).
91515 S.W.2d at 476; 6ee aao: 237 So.2d at 10.
2 See: T.E. Morris, Housing Codes: Cowut DeteAmination oj
Reazonabtenez6, 23 University of Florida Law Review 195, 200 (1970);
Chalfen, Economic Inequity and the Houaing Code, 10 Urban Law Annual
335, 343 (1975).
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rent withholding laws, receivership, and repair and deduct laws, the
most frequently used mechanism remains the criminal remedy.93 Criminal
sanctions, including imprisonment or fines, however, have in general
proven to be unsatisfactory means with which to accomplish code
enforcement.
The major problems besetting the criminal remedy are the result
of imperfections within the judicial system itself. The criminal
remedy focuses upon the culpability of the defendant rather than the
substandard condition of the building.95 Thus, personal jurisdiction
over the landlord is required before the criminal court can proceed.
Unfortunately, true ownership of a building can be easily concealed,
through the corporate form or other types of ownership. Therefore,
officials may be required to spend large amounts of time tracking down
96
the real owner and serving him with process. Also, the sheer volume
of inspections produces an overwhelming number of cases which overcrowds
court dockets and results in lengthy delays. Overcrowded dockets
appear to exist even in jurisdictions where many cases are disposed of
9 3Grad, SupLa note 75, at 577.
The criminal remedy has generally been preferred to the civil
remedy since the civil suit involves more detailed pleadings than does
the criminal suit. Moreover, collection of a civil judgment is
confined to the traditional mechanism of execution upon the property
of the defendant. U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems, Zupta
note 7, at 287-8.
9 4Diamond, Rehabit&tation o6 Low Income Howsing Thaough Coope'taUtve
Convezion, 25 American University Law Review 285 (1976).
9 5Gribetz and Grad, Zupta note 1, at 1277.
9 6Abbott, 6upta note 19, at 50.
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summarily.97 In addition to clogged dockets, criminal prosecutions
require high standards of proof and complicated procedural safeguards
which increase the amount of time lawyers and code inspectors must spend
98
on trial preparation and in court.
The lack of adequate penalties for code violators presents
another obstacle to successful code enforcement. Although many
jurisdictions allow imprisonment for code violators, such statutes are
rarely used.99 Fines have been imposed with similar laxity. In many
states, code enforcement violation fines are so small that they are more
properly considered licensing fees rather than penalties. In many
instances, an owner may find it more economical to pay repeated fines
than to comply with code requirements. He will merely treat the payment
of such small fines as a cost of doing business.101
Laxity in the imposition of sanctions is, in many cases, the
result of judicial attitude. Courts have been reluctant to treat
9 7 Levi, Focat Levetage Points in P'oblems Retating to Rea2
PropeLty in Housing In America: Problems and Perspectives 477
(Mandelker and Montgomery eds. 1973).
9 8 Lieberman, The Admini&sotative Pttoceas: Hou.ing Code Endoement,
3 Urban Lawyer 551, 552 (1971).
Levi points out that where code inspection officials are required
to spend many hours in the courtroom, the effectiveness of code enforcement
will be "correspondingly reduced". Levi, Supta note 97, at 477.
99Listokin, The Dynamica o6 Houzing Rehabititation: Micno and
Mac&w AnalySi6 53 (1973).
10 0Levi, 4upLac note 97, at 477.
1 0 1Listokin, 6uphLa note 99, at 53.
Note that fines are not considered allowable business deductions
for income tax purposes.
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delinquent landlords as criminals, partly because criminal court judges
do not generally consider housing code violations as serious crimes. 1 0 2
Housing code violations are frequently viewed as "social welfare" or
administrative offenses, which constitute a violation against the
community only because the community has set certain standards of
conduct which must be met.103 More importantly, judges are usually
reluctant to impose harsh penalties on landlords who are "respected
members of the community" and generous contributors to many important
social causes. Similarly, the public does not respond well to a program
which attempts to place prominent community figures in the role of
criminals. 104
C. ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL OBSTACLES
A host of administrative problems decrease the efficiency of
housing code enforcement. One of these is a lack of sufficient
"patrolling" mechanisms. Routine code inspections are rare, particularly
in slum areas. Thus, violations are generally processed only after a
105
private complaint has been received and criminal sanctions are used
1 0 2Grad, 5uptLa note 75, at 579.
1 0 3Lieberman, .6upta note 98, at 552.
1 0 4Office of Regional and Community Development, Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D.C., Howuing: A Souace
Book 60A State SocLat Setvice Agencies at IV-I [ n.d.] .
1 0 5 Fishman, ed. , Houwing 604 Ate Undet the Law: New Ditections
in Housing, Land Use and Planning Law 555 (1978).
Diamond suggests that in many localities these complaints are
handled on an ad hoc basis. "This approach to enforcement . . . results
in limiting the kinds of complaints that can be handled and in creating
severe backlogs for those complaints which are handled, [ and ] is often
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only after administrative remedies have failed to compel voluntary
compliance. Once a criminal remedy is necessary, however, most
jurisdictions require the municipality to institute proceedings and
forbid tenants from filing their own actions.106 In any case, code
enforcement is usually applied only to structures that pose immediate
threats to health or safety.1 0 7
Ironically, code enforcement is not necessarily concentrated in
the worst parts of a city.108 Not only is it common for the level of
code enforcement to be low in areas of the city that need it the most,
but there is also considerable variation in the enforcement standards
which are applied to different sections of a city. The U.S. Health
Service has blamed this lack of uniformity in code enforcement on the
institutionalization of criminal rather than civil penalties which it
claims has resulted in a lack of attention to the administrative problems
of implementing a uniform standard of housing.109 Others have blamed the
lack of code conformity on the scarcity of properly trained housing
a function of the demand for enforcement increasing at a much greater
rate than the localities' capability to enforce." Diamond, p45LLa note 94,
at 290 (footnote omitted).
1 0 6Fishman, 4upa note 105, at 555.
107id
108 The inadequacy of code enforcement within the oldest and most
dilapidated areas of a city is frequently due to a realization that the
cost of bringing many of the structures within such areas up to code
standard would exceed the value of the structures themselves. Moreover,
the present tenants of such housing are likely to be unable to afford the
increased rents necessary to finance such improvements.
1 0 9Office of Regional and Community Development, .6upta note 104,
at IV-I.
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inspectors. These critics claim that this personnel shortage is caused
by .the inadequate recruitement of qualified individuals into code
enforcement careers.110
Further problems are generated by the bureaucratic structure
within which housing codes are enforced. Housing codes are generally
administered and enforced by county or municipal agencies. Implementation
by local officials renders the enforcement process particularly vulnerable
to local political pressures. Moreover, the tremendous personal
discretion frequently vested in local building inspectors increases the
opportunity for abuse.111
The local organization of code enforcement agencies has also been
blamed for the present ineffectiveness of code enforcement programs.
Although one recent trend in municipal reform has been the consolidation
of code enforcement into a single agency, many localities still maintain
a system whereby several local agencies or departments are responsible
for code enforcement, with little or no coordination among these
entities. 112 As Levi describes:
City building departments, whose historical emphasis has
been on original construction, are now faced with the
necessity of making countless inspections upon existing
housing; inspections which are often complicated by
overly-bureaucratic practices and inter-agency conflicts.
1 1 0Listokin, Supa note 99, at 53. See atso: Gribetz, Howsing
Code EnoLncement in 1970 - An Oveuview, 3 Urban Lawyer 525, 528 (1971).
illField and Rivkin, The Building Code Bwden (1975).
Where the price of a bribe is less than the cost of compliance,
and where an inspector is receptive to graft, the temptation for
corruption is strong.
112Fishman, 6upka note 105, at 555.
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For example, most municipal building departments are
organized into bureaus, whose jurisdiction is patterned
on trade union lines. Thus, one of the plumbing
bureau's inspectors will inspect the plumbing, while
another inspector, sent out by the electricity bureau
will check the electrical wiring. Moreover, should the
plumbing inspector find a defective wiring system, he
cannot issue a notice of violation, but may only inform
the proper bureau of his discovery. 1 1 3
The budgetary impact of code enforcement frequently presents an
additional obstacle to local code improvement efforts. The budgetary
inadequacies of code enforcement may be attributable, in many communities,
to a scarcity of municipal revenues and the political decision to
allocate the bulk of these limited resources to other government programs.
Finally, state governments must take part of the blame for
inadequate local code enforcement. The U.S. National Commission on
Urban Problems notes that once the state delegates its police power to
localities to enable local code enforcement, it generally takes no
additional steps to monitor the adequacy of the local use of this
delegated power nor offers 'needed assistance in the formulation of
114
local code administration policy..
D. THE COST OF COMPLIANCE
Many policymakers assume that landlords are "better able to bear
the costs of code improvements" than are their tenants. This assumption,
however, is generally not correct, particularly when applied to the
landlords of low-rent properties. There is evidence that low-rent
housing yields moderate profits at best. For example, Sternlieb
1 1 3Levi, Supka note 97, at 477.
114U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems, SupAa note 7, at 288.
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discovered that the average "actual return on investment in terms of
the overall parcel value is clearly in the neighborhood of 10 to 12
percent." 115
The cost of code improvements may in fact present the most
formidable obstacle to code compliance from a landlord's perspective.
Many owners find it impossible to obtain even conventional financing for
dwellings for which the cost of code enforcement cannot be recouped by
rent hikes 116 or decreases in operating costs or would be disproportion-
ately high relative to the value of the property.117 '
A landlord faced with the prospect of loss due to the cost of code
enforcement may view selling as the only way out of this unprofitable
investment. However, the market for substandard buildings is likely to
be soft, where codes are diligently enforced and where the new owner will
be faced with the costs of improvements before he can derive income from
the property.ll8 Some landlords, unable to sell, either abandon or
convert the property to another use when housing code enforcement renders
continued operation economically infeasible.
E. THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF NON-ENFORCEMENT
Officials attempting to enforce housing codes face a formidable
1 1 5Sternlieb, The Tenement Landlotd 88 (1966).
116
Rarely are low income tenants in a financial position to pay the
higher rents of improved units. This fact has been the source of the
movement to provide income transfers, (e.g., rent subsidies), to indigent
tenants who are affected by code enforcement. Hirsch and Margolis,
aupta note 43, at 208.
11 7Listokin, 6upta 99, at 54.
Id. at 54-5.
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dilemma since in enforcing such codes they frequently make housing
unaffordable for those at the bottom of the market.119 These displaced
families must live somewhere and thus the enforcement of housing codes
merely increases the demand for substandard, affordable housing. As
more families are forced to search for substandard housing and as the
supply of such housing is increasingly diminished, owners of these
remaining sub-code units are able to ask for higher rents.120 Thus, as
competition for these remaining units increases, the overall economic
position of the very poor is worsened.
Where code enforcement leads to higher rents or abandonment, many
localities have no choice but to decrease or eliminate code enforcement
in areas where its implementation causes adverse economic impacts.
The U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems points out that:
Assuming the best intent, funding and prosecution, code
enforcement may be purposely blunted by local government
in a situation of short housing supply in order to avoid
the loss of dwelling units that might be vacated on court
order and then held vacant by the owner to avoid the
cost of repairs.121
Displacement is viewed as a greater harm than sub-code housing. Thus,
119
I accept Komesar's argument that landlords are able to pass the
increased cost of code enforcement on to their tenants through higher
rents or will abandon such housing where continued operation becomes
infeasible.
1 2 0 Rents in substandard housing will not however increase to a level
equivalent to those charged for units meeting code specifications.
U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems, Zupta note 7, at 286.
Moreover, where code enforcement may result in abandonment, city
officials may prefer to avoid the problems of vandalism and arson which
are associated with vacant buildings by opting for nonenforcement of
the code. Id. at 286.
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localities are frequently given no choice but to ignore housing code
violations, since bad housing is better than no housing at all.
Finally, in certain situations, evasion of the law is actually
encouraged by the market consequences of nonenforcement. Where an
apartment building is old and deteriorated its continued operation may
yield substantial profits. High profits earned by the operation of sub-
code housing is dependent on enforcement of the code in other parts of
the area. Landlords of sub-code housing who avoid the costs of code
improvement can maintain occupancy by attracting tenants who are forced
to move out of housing where rents are raised by code enforcement.
These landlords continue to attract tenants and also escape the costs
of code improvement. Larger gains can be made if the number of tenants
who desire the low rents of sub-code housing exceeds the number of sub-
code units available. However, rents in these sub-code units will not
rise to the rent levels of code-improved units since tenants will not be
willing to pay the same amo-unt for sub-code housing as they are forced
to pay for code-improved housing,.unless a severe housing shortage leaves
them with no alternative.
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VI. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems reported as its
single most important finding concerning housing codes "that minimum
standards, while enforceable, are often unenforced." 1 2 2 Although
housing code enforcement has been successful in some communities, such
successes are usually found where the regulations are so vague, or the
tenants so prosperous, that they represent virtually no constraint on
ownership.123 More meaningful codes cannot be administered effectively
enough to achieve full compliance even with minimum requirements of
health and safety.124 Levi asserts that the expectation of nonenforcement
has long been an accepted fact within the housing market. She suggests
that "unit rentals, gross rent rolls, capital asset value - in fact the
complete market system function on the assumption that the municipality
either cannot or will not enforce housing or zoning codes in slum areas." 1 2 5
In recognition of the failures of comprehensive housing code
enforcement, alternative programs for reform are offered. One such
proposal is the maintenance of the single standard housing code with
increased administrative and enforcement mechanisms. This scheme would
require continued use of a uniform standard applied throughout the
22U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems, Supta note 7, at 274.
1 2 3 Nason, Municipat Intw entionz in the Btfding Ptoce5, (1977)
(unpublished M. Arch. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
1 2 4U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems, 6upta note 7, at 275.
1 2 5Levi, upka note 97, at 476.
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enforcement area and replacement of criminal sanctions for noncompliance
with a cumulative civil penalty. Gribetz and Grad supported such a view
and also encouraged abandonment of our present reliance on criminal
sanctions. 126 Code enforcement coupled with rent control has also been
proposed as a means of insuring code improvements while at the same time
restricting rent increases. The flexible housing code is another reform
proposal which has gained considerable attention in recent years as a
possible alternative to the single standard housing code. The flexible
housing code allows for the application of variable standards which
correspond to the maintenance and repair needs of housing within
designated code enforcement districts. This proposal may however run up
against constitutional obstacles since, in essence, it is a selective
enforcement scheme in the form of varying code standards applied to
different sections of the city.127 A fourth alternative is the
enforcement of a minimum housing code through a certification process
with reliance on private contractual rights to provide additional
housing quality. This last alternative is the most realistic since
reforms which continue to rely on current code enforcement mechanisms fall
victim to the same problems of enforcement abuse as do traditional types
1 2 6 Gribetz and Grad, zupta note 1.
In 1970, Gribetz modified his earlier position and suggested that
the answer lies not in the need for reform in code enforcement mechanisms
but instead in the need for more funding to administer existing enforce-
ment sanctions. Gribetz, Supa- note 110, at 531.
Grad,' however, maintained his earlier position in an article also
written in 1970. Grad, 6upLa note 75.
See: Landman, Supta note 16, for an explanation of the flexible
housing code scheme.
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of housing codes.
A. MAINTENANCE OF THE SINGLE STANDARD CODE
WITH INCREASED ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
The existence of a minimum housing code does not insure that all
housing will be maintained in compliance with such standards. Thus,
some observers find that the major flaw of our single code system lies
in the use of present enforcement mechanisms. They suggest administrative
and enforcement reforms rather than abandonment of the single standard
code.
The major attack is on the widespread reliance on the criminal
sanction that neither guarantees that repairs will be made nor serves as
a deterrent to other noncomplying landlords.128 Instead, the solution
suggested is the formulation of a new civil remedy which has as its goal
the improvement of substandard buildings rather than the punishment of
noncomplying landlords.129 The thrust of this prop6sal is to place
economic sanctions on housing code violations since they are "basically
economic offenses".130 Gribetz and Grad suggest that a cumulative
civil penalty, buttressed by receivership and direct repair programs, is
preferable to tenant self-help remedies. This penalty would be instituted
by the municipality and the amount of the fine would relate to the period
over which the landlord fails to comply with code requirements.
Unfortunately, the Gribetz-Grad proposal corrects for only one
1 2 8Gribetz and Grad, Zupka note 1, at 1276.
12 9 id. at 1281.
130 d
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of the problems of current code enforcement. The issue of whether
tenants are willing to pay for the real cost of better housing is not
addressed. Similarly, their scheme does not address the failures of the
inspection process, including the inadequacy of code enforcement
personnel and the potential for political graft; the inability of
landlords to meet the costs of code improvements and the issue of the
development of appropriate standards.
B. CODE ENFORCEMENT WITH RENT CONTROL
A likely response to the criticism that code enforcement leads to
rent increases would be a scheme which combines the beneficial effects
of code enforcement with a method which prohibits a concomitant increase
in rents. One possible way to accomplish this goal would be the
introduction of rent control legislation which would prevent the
landlord from passing the costs of code enforcement to his tenants.
Unfortunately, combining two systems which are presently ineffective
when applied singularly, does not, in this case, produce, one system which
is effective.
Rent controls have been instituted in response to rapidly escalating
rents that result from housing shortages caused by population increases,
removal of housing from the market, and/or changes in housing tastes.131
131
Lett, Rent ContAot: Concepts, Reatitia , and Mechanizm4 38
(1976).
For example, the first rent control legislation which appeared in
this country was passed in response to the housing shortages created
during World War I. These shortages were caused by a shift of labor
and materials from domestic construction to defense production and
by the rapid migration of workers to centers of defense production.
Id. at 1.
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Persons of low and moderate incomes as well as persons on fixed incomes,
particularly the elderly, are those most in need of controls in times
of inflationary rent increases. However, as housing costs have increased
at a faster rate than real spendable income, particularly since 1970,
rent control has become a form of rent subsidy to middle income tenants
as well. 1 3 2
The primary goal of rent control is to maintain current prices of
housing without a decrease in quality. Therefore, tenants in rent-
controlled housing will pay less than they would in an uncontrolled
market. Some proponents of rent control have suggested that a successful
rent control program cannot only maintain but even reduce current rents
without decreasing housing quality. In these situations, rent control
would have the effect of increasing the amount of disposable income
available for the consumption of non-housing goods. 1 33
However, one of the major criticisms of current rent control
programs is their adverse effect on housing quality. Critics argue that
expenditures on repair and maintenance are of the few variable costs
associated with the operation of housing.134 A landlord who is prevented,
by rent control, from raising rents in times of rising operating costs
will be forced to either absorb the losses or cut his expenses. The
first option may be either unavailable or unattractive to a landlord since
132Id. at 38-9.
Id. at 44.
1 3 4Lett notes that other operating expenses such as real estate
taxes, fuel and utilities charges, payroll costs, management and
administrative fees, insurance costs and debt service requirements are
all relatively fixed costs. Id. at 46.
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his profit margin may already be severely limited due to the pressures
of inflation or he may be unwilling to reach into his own pocket to
compensate for the deficiency. Thus, he may turn instead to a
reduction in repair and maintenance expenditures. When this option is
chosen, the net result is a decrease in the quality of housing service,
without a similar decrease in rent levels, and stepped-up deterioration
of the housing stock.1 3 5
If rent control could successfully maintain rents, then a
combination of rent control and code enforcement would stabilize rents
while also prevent landlords from reducing maintenance and repair levels
in response to rent freezes.136 However, there are some persuasive argu-
ments to suggest that rent control is not an effective means with which
to control rents.
1. Adverse Anticipatory Reactions
When landlords are threatened with the possibility of rent
control, some react by immediately increasing rents to protect themselves
l35It may be argued that a decrease in rent levels is not
warranted because tenants are already paying below-market-rate rents
for a given quality of housing. Therefore a decrease in repair and
maintenance merely stabilizes the level of rent paid with the amount of
housing service received.
13 6Through code enforcement, landlords would be prevented from
lowering maintenance and repair standards only below those levels
required by the housing code. Nothing in this scheme prohibits
landlords from reducing their maintenance from levels which already
exceed minimum code requirements. This effect may not be significant
however, since many rent control statutes have "pass-through"
provisions which allow landlords to pass on to tenants the costs of
improvements which exceed the minimum standards set forth within
the housing code.
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once the rent freeze is instituted.137 These anticipatory rent increases
thwart the goal of rent control, yet there is little which can be done to
prevent this reaction.
Similarly, the imposition of rent control may have a secondary
effect of reducing new construction. As Lett explains:
Although new construction is generally exempt from
controls, the housing industry is often wary of possible
future extensions of controls. Consequently, opponents
of rent control maintain that investors may turn to
communities without such controls or abandon the rental
market entirely and focus on the construction of fee-
simple, owner-occupied housing, particularly since there
has been increased demand for condominiums. 1 38
2. Inequitable Distribution of Benefits
The redistributive goals of rent control are diluted by the
inability of the system to accurately target intended beneficiaries.
Generally, rent control is applied without regard to the income levels
of present and prospective tenants.139 Therefore, those who benefit from
rent control may not be poor or on fixed incomes. Moreover, once rent
control is imposed, current tenants are discouraged from! moving since
in so doing they may forfeit their rent control benefits if they cannot
find replacement housing under similar controls. This restraint which
rent control places on tenant mobility decreases the number of potential
beneficiaries of the law.
13 7Where tenants have entered into leases which prevent rent
increases during the term of the lease, the ability of the landlord to
raise rents in anticipation of rent control is temporarily limited until
expiration of the lease period.
1 3 8Lett, ZupWa note 131, at 45.
Id. at 47.
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3. Abandonment and Conversion Effects
Although a program of code enforcement with rent control may
prevent a landlord from reducing maintenance and repairs below the
minimum level required by the housing code, this scheme does not
address the economic problems which beset a landlord when his profit
margin is suddenly reduced by the imposition of code improvement costs
and, because of rent control, he is unable to pass these costs on to
tenants. If a landlord's profits are so decreased, such that continued
operation results in a deficit, the only alternative available is
abandonment or conversion. When this occurs, the supply of housing is
reduced and those tenants not lucky enough to reside in existing rent-
controlled units will suffer rent increases as additional demand is
placed on the housing stock by tenants displaced by abandonment or
.140
conversion.
C. THE FLEXIBLE HOUSING CODE
The concept of a flexible, zoned housing code developed as early
as 1927.141 This type of housing code developed in part out of a
recognition that one result of the present system of code enforcement
is the selective application of a single standard housing code.142
1 4 0The authors of one article suggest that to prevent abandonment
or conversion, rent control and code enforcement should be coupled with
subsidies to landlords for code improvement costs. Hartman, Kessler,
and LeGates, Municipat Houlsing Code EniotLcement and Low-Income Tenants,
40 J. Am. Inst. Planners 90 (March 1974).
1 4 1Landman, dSup!La note 16, at 305.
142One supporter of the flexible housing code states that " i n
reality, there is little, if any, housing code enforcement; there is
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De facto selective code enforcement is a response to the differing
maintenance requirements of housing. Some neighborhoods have housing
for which only minimal repairs and preventive maintenance procedures
are needed, while in other areas, extensive rehabilitation measures may
be necessary to bring housing up to habitable levels. Finally, there
are some neighborhoods where code enforcement would do little or
nothing for structures which are so deteriorated that demolition is the
only economically rational solution.
In deriving its existence from the unsuccessful application of
the single standard code, the flexible housing code is in actuality a
codification and legitimization of selective enforcement. It provides
for a variety of maintenance standards which are applied to correspond
to the needs of designated housing code districts. Thus, the proposal
for a flexible housing code is targeted toward reform of the enforcement
mechanism of the present system and is not a reframing of the current
concept of housing codes.
Although the flexible housing code does no more, in fact, than
.the present selective enforcement system, this proposed zoned code
presents greater constitutional questions of equal protection. Under
the present selective enforcement system there are no equal protection
problems since mere nonenforcement of a regulation is not generally
viewed as an equal protection problem. Instead, an equal protection
violation is found only where this nonenforcement is coupled with a
showing of intentional discrimination rather than discrimination which
flexible, or selective, enforcement of the single standard housing code."
Landman, aupaa note 16, at 255.
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is merely the result of laxity in enforcement.143 By definition, the
flexible housing code requires an intentional differentiation among
housing. Thus, the question becomes whether these distinctions are
valid under the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause requires that all persons or property
similarly situated be accorded substantially equal and uniform treatment.
This provision does not prohibit the regulation of private property but
it does require such regulations to be reasonably related to legitimate
public interests in protecting health and safety and that the means used
to foster such goals are not based on classifications which are not
germane to the prevention of the stated public evil. In short, the
equal protection clause safeguards against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination in the application of public regulations.
The crucial question in cases which raise equal protection
issues is whether a legitimate public interest is furthered by
differences in treatment among persons or property. A reasonable test
of the validity of a classification is whether any substantial benefit
or burden, conferred upon one class as compared with other classes,
bears a reasonable relationship to the goals of the regulation:144
143 Daton v. Van Dien 339 N.Y.S.2d 378, 382, 72 Misc.2d 287, 292
(1972); City o6 Mute Beach v. MayoiL 256 S.C. 130, 181 S.E.2d 265 (1971).
See also: OgleA V. Boyfe&, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L.Ed.2d
446 (1962), where the U.S. Supreme Court found that the conscious exercise
of selectivity in enforcement was not itself a violation of the equal
protection clause where the selection was not deliberately based upon
an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or arbitrary classifi-
cation.
1 4 416AC.J.S. Constitutional Law 505 (1956).
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The prohibition against denial of equal protection does
not preclude a state or municipality from resorting to
classification for purposes of legislation and confining
the legislation to a certain class or classes prescribing
different sets of rules for different classes or discrim-
ination in favor of, or against a certain class, provided
the classification is reasonable, rather than arbitrary
and rests on a real or substantial difference or distinction
which bears a just and reasonable relation to the legis-
lation or subject or object thereof and ptovided alzo the
Zegisation opues equally, uni otumty and impatiLly
on al& persons om poperty within a cla&z. (emphasis
added). 145
By its very nature, a single standard housing code creates
classifications of housing types and applies different standards to
meet the public health and safety needs of each. It recognizes that
the requirements for single family residences may be different than those
for apartment buildings or for rooming houses. In contrast, the flexible
housing code appears to make distinctions within classes of housing types
on the basis of the conditions of the neighborhood where the housing is
located. Different code enforcement strategies are applied to housing
in neighborhoods which have been classified by some subjective assessment
into one of three categories of "hopless" (demolition), "improveable"
(rehabilitation) or "currently acceptable" (conservation). By virture
of this classification, some landlords will be forced to improve while
landlords owning property of the same type and condition but located
within a different neighborhood will escape the costs of such improvements.
Landlords who are not forced to make code improvements will enjoy an
economic advantage over those who are required to improve their
properties. Differentiation on the basis of location alone is not
145id. (footnotes omitted).
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reasonably related to the goal of public health and safety and thus
serious questions of the validity of the flexible housing code, in light
of equal protection clause limitations, are raised.
The cases which proponents of the flexible housing code cite in
support of the constitutionality of such a scheme appear to be based on
classifications related to the nature of the housing structure itself
and not to the general condition of the neighborhood. For example, in
CLty o4 Chicago v. MUlet, 27 Ill.2d 211, 188 N.E.2d 694 (1963), the
Supreme Court of Illinois upheld an ordinance which exempted one- and
two-family units from the code requirement of a single bathroom facility
per unit despite equal protection arguments that such a classification
was arbitrary and improper. This ruling allowed tenants residing in
two-family units located in the same dwelling to share a single bathroom.
Underlying the court's decision appears to be a recognition that tenants
of smaller units, (e.g., a single family dwelling unit which has been
converted into a two-family unit) may have different health and safety
needs than those residing in larger buildings. Therefore, the decision
merely allows classifications based on differences in housing size and
does not reach the question of the validity of classifications based
solely on housing location.
Similarly, the cases in which the courts have struck down
structurally-based classifications, and which flexible housing code
advocates attempt to distinguish, shed little light on the issue of
location-oriented classifications. For example, in 84ennan v. Uitwaukee,
265 Wis. 52, 60 N.W.2d 704 (1953), the Wisconsin Supreme Court struck
down an ordinance requiring the installation of a bathtub or shower in
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apartments containing three or more rooms. The court recognized that the
ordinance distinguishing apartments with fewer than three rooms from
apartments with three or more rooms was based on concerns over the
number of persons using a bath. Although this classification may be
appropriate with regard to rooming houses, the court found that it was
not appropriate with respect to the classification of apartment houses
since these ordinances improperly "assume or imply that there are fewer
occupants in a three-room apartment than in a four-or five-or six-room
apartment."146 The court concludes:
[I]t is . . . admitted that there may be as many
occupants in a three-room apartment as in a six-room
apartment. If personal cleanliness is the purpose to
be attained and the number of rooms is not a rational
index to the number of people who occupy them, then the
differentiation cannot be reasonably based on the
number of rooms. 1 4 7
What the court appears to be saying is that it is not improper to require
bathtubs or showers but if the housing code does require such facilities,
then housing, regardless of size, must be subject to the regulation. 14 8
One supporter of the flexible housing code scheme attempts to get
14660 N.W.2d. 704, 707.
147id
148See aao: StaLings v. City o6 Jacksonovlfe, 333 So.2d 70
(Fla. App. 1970), where the court found that units containing central
heating furnaces and air conditioning could not be exempted from
the screen door requirements of the housing code. Since screen doors
prevent the infiltration of disease-carrying insects, the court
found that the danger is equally great in artificially ventilated
dwellings as it is in naturally ventilated dwellings. "Entrance doors
to centrally air conditioned dwellings must be opened and closed for
ingress and egress the same as an entrance door to non-centrally air
conditioned dwellings." 333 So.2d 70,72.
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around the BStennan decision by suggesting that "[w]henever slums are
eliminated, sound areas rehabilitated and the good areas conserved the
community is benefited and the public welfare enhanced."J49 But this
argument is insufficient since there is no evidence that the elimination
of slums is a greater public good than their rehabilitation. Some may
argue that the displacement and disruption of family and neighborhood
ties occasioned by urban renewal is a harm sufficient to warrant a
policy against the total razing of slum areas. Moreover, since the
goal of housing codes is to protect health and safety, and not necessarily
to achieve other public goals, the flexible housing code does not
guarantee that it can better promote health and safety standards than
can a uniformly applied single standard housing code.
Although the flexible housing code does not correct for the
underlying failures of the current housing code system, it does come
closest to recognizing that people have different housing needs and that
these differences should be reflected in varying housing code standards.
However, the flexible housing code does not define housing standards
such that the benefits which they provide outweigh the costs which
they impose on tenants.
1 4 9Landman, 6upa note 16, at 309.
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VII. UNDERLYING FAILURES OF THE HOUSING CODE CONCEPT
WHICH THREATEN THE EFFICACY OF HOUSING CODE REFORM
Housing codes are capable of successful enforcement. Unfortunately,
given the present administrative, economic and political environment in
which they exist, the cost of enforcement generally outweighs the
benefits. Even if the problems of enforcement could be corrected, there
are two important failures which underlie the housing code concept and
threaten the efficacy of any reform measure which is aimed primarily at
improving the enforcement of the present system.
Housing codes derive validity from their relationship to the
promotion of health and safety goals. However, some municipal code
provisions go beyond the mere assurance of these minimum requirements and
instead promote certain materials and construction industries or specific
values of housing quality. Therefore, the underlying problems of the
present system are ones of -improper beneficiaries and the inappropriate-
ness of housing standards.
A. IMPROPER BENEFICIARIES
A significant, yet rarely publicized, beneficiary of housing code
enforcement is the construction industry. Codes are powerful means
through which certain rehabilitation construction methods and materials
are favored, thus causing a limit on competition and a concomitant rise
150
in code improvement costs. Similarly, the more complex repair and
maintenance standards become, the less opportunity there is for the
1 5 0 Field and Rivkin, zupta note 111, at 2.
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landlord to make repairs himself. In some instances, e.g., wiring and
plumbing, it may be illegal for the landlord to make such repairs. Thus,
members of the construction industry have a direct stake in the content
and enforcement of housing codes and powerful lobbying groups have
developed to protect those interests. 1 5 1
There are two primary ways in which the construction industry
benefits from strictly-enforced, maximum housing code requirements:
through specific building material requirements and labor restrictions.
1. Building Materials
Restrictions in the use of building materials in some cases are
important to the promotion of health or safety.152 However, the purpose
of other specific building material requirements in the promotion of
health and safety is more tenuous.
1 5 1For example, at least one court has allowed an association of
plumbing contractors standing to review the governing bqdy's decision
barring the use of plastic piping. In so holding, the court found
that the state building code permits local variation with respect to
plumbing materials. A66ociation o6 Emptoying PLumbing Cont&actou- o6
Na5aa County, Inc. v. Gagnot, 48 A.D.2d 892, 369 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1975).
On review, the Supreme Court Special Term found that where the town
had voluntarily adopted the state building code which permitted the
use of plastic pipes in certain structures, the town was without
authority to promulgate an order contrary to the state rule. 84 Misc.2d
990, 378 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1975).
It is questionable whether this case involves concern over the
true differences in local physical or environmental conditions or
merely the relative lobbying powers of state and local unions and
materials producers. Interestingly, a proprietor of a local plumbing
and heating firm testified that "plastic pipe is cheaper, easier to
install and would eventually eliminate the use of licensed plumbers."
378 N.Y.S.2d 241, 247.
15 2For example, the use of fire retardant materials.
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The net effect of building material restrictions is twofold.
First, is cost. Building material restrictions allow the producers of
such materials to enjoy a monopoly of sorts. The result is that where
"building materials are produced by industries with high degrees of
concentration . . . [it is not unlikely ] that production is inefficient
prices are above marginal cost and innovation is restrained."1 5 3
The second effect of building material restrictions is a resistance
to technological change. The benefits which accrue to the building
industry via building material restrictions result in an understandable
reluctance on the part of producers to promote technological innovations.
Although such innovations may reduce costs in terms of materials and
labor for landlords, their int.roduction will also have the effect of
reducing the economic benefits currently enjoyed by producers of code-
required building materials.154 Thus, the building industry has an
1 5 3 Alonso, Hassid, Smith, IndoAmation on and Evatutiaons o6
Innovations in Housing Design and Constuction Techniques as Applied to
Low-Cost Housing 51 (1969).
Although the authors speak primarily with reference to building
codes, the same principles are applicable to housing codes.
Alonso suggests that some industry concentration may have the
opposite effect and may in fact produce positive results. For
example, major cost-reducing innovations, in plywood and wallboard,
aluminum window sashes and exterior finishes, have been produced by
oligopolistic industries. Id. at 51.
154
Although Alonso suggests that the cost-reducing potential of
code reform has substantially decreased because most major cost efficient
reforms have already been instituted, this recognition does not diminish
the fact that some building industry members continue to benefit from
the specification of building materials within housing codes. These
material requirements allow some producers to reap substantial profits
which might not otherwise be gained, if landlords were free to choose
among varying types of materials.
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interest in preventing changes in code requirements which in turn may
discourage technological innovation. As Alonso explains:
Within the existing set of rules they [business people]
have some modest scope for innovation, but the pace
is tedious, and the process moves mostly in the direction
of cost-AaioSing rather than cost-reducing innovations
. .155
2. Labor Restrictions
Labor restrictions have a direct impact on the cost of housing
code improvements. And the construction industry has been successful in
limiting labor through both union and code regulations. For example,
work quotas are often set by shinglers', masons' and bricklayers' locals
and in some jurisdictions certain labor-saving tools, such as paint
rollers and automatic nailers, have been prohibited.156 Similarly,
municipal codes may themselves restrict labor by, for example, requiring
that only licensed plumbers do plumbing. 1 5 7
B. INAPPROPRIATE HOUSING STANDARDS
1. Dubious Benefits
There is no question that a lack of basic housing services has a
great impact on health and safety. An early study on the affect of
housing quality on health found that inadequate bathroom facilities,
poor heating and ventilation, and improper sleeping arrangements
contributed to acute respiratory infections and the transmission of
15 5Alonso, Hassid, Smith, SupIta note 153, at 65.
156Little, Houding: Expectationz and Reaitiae 96 (1971).
1 5 7Field and Rivkin, zupta note 111, at 41.
73
certain infectious childhood diseases. Poor bathroom facilities were
also linked to minor digestive diseases, enteritis and infectious and
noninfectious skin diseases. Finally, household accidents were
associated with crowded or inadequate kitchens, bad electrical
connections and poorly lit and structurally unsound stairways. 1 5 8
In the United States today we have succeeded in eliminating, to
.a large extent, those substandard housing conditions which present real
threats to personal health and safety.159 As Glazer notes: "[A]lmost
all urban dwellings have running hot and cold water and toilet facilities,
are connected with sewers and are relatively uncrowded. Most are covered
by public health services and building regulations which prevent the
worst abuses."160 Therefore, many, if not most, modern housing code
provisions are not based on health and safety criteria but instead are
"fessentially matters of comfort, morality or convenience and amenities." 161
Since we have virtually eliminated serious health and safety
hazards, the question becomes whether "better" housingl62 produces social
and economic gains for the tenant as well as for society. Alonso
points out that during the 1940's and 1950's there were attempts made to
158Wilner, Walkey and Tayback, How Does The QuaPCty o6 Hou6ing
A6ect HedL&th and FamiLy Adjustment, 46 American Journal of Public
Health 736-44 (June 1956).
159See: Table 2, p. 75; Table 3, p. 76.
160Glazer, The E6ects o6 Poon. Howsing in Housing in Urban America
165 (Pynoos ed. 1973).
16 1Parratt, s5uptca note 25, at 171.
1 6 2
"Better" housing is defined as that level of quality which
exceeds minimum standards necessary to protect health and safety.
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TABLE 2
*
TRENDS IN PHYSICAL ADEQUACY 1940-1976
Criteria of
Physical Adequacy 1940 1950 1960 1970 1976(% of all occupied
units)
Lacking Some or All 44.6 34.0 15.2 5.1 2.5
Plumbing Facilities
Dilapidated 18.1 9.1 5.8 3.7 NA
Lacking Some or All
Plumbing Facilities 48.6 35.4 17.0 7.5 NA
and/or Dilapidated
In Need of NA NA NA NA 7.8
Rehabilitation
Source: Background Paper, Fedeia Housing Potlcy: Cuent PAogtons
and Recaving Issues (1977).
**
The U.S. Bureau of Census definition of
over time.
"dilapidated" has varied
"In need of rehabilitation" is defined as having at least one of
the following conditions: (1) absence of complete plumbing facilities;
(2) absence of complete kitchen facilities; (3) the absence of either a
public sewer connection, a septic tank, or cesspool; (4) 3 or more break-
downs of 6 or more hours each time in the sewer, septic tank or cesspool
during the prior 90 days; (5) 3 or more breakdowns of 6 or more hours each
time in the sewer, septic tank or cesspool during last winter; (6) 3 or more
times completely without water for 6 or more hours each time during last 90
days; (7) 3 or more times completely without flush toilet for 6 or more
hours each time during prior 90 days and/or if the unit had two or more of
the following conditions: (1) leaking roof; (2) holes in interior floors;
(3) open cracks or holes in interior walls or ceiling: (4) broken plaster
over greater than one square foot of interior walls or ceilings; (5) un-
concealed wiring; (6) the absence of a working light in public hallways
for multi-unit structures; (7) loose or no handrails for multi-unit
structures; (8) loose, broken or missing steps in public hallways in
multi-unit structures.
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TABLE 3
*
TRENDS IN OVERCROWDING 1940-19 76
Criteria of
Overcrowding 1940 1950 1960 1970 1976
(% of all
households)
More Than 1.5 Persons 9.0 6.2 3.6 2.0 1.0
Per Room
More Than 1.0 Persons 20.3 15.7 11.5 8.0 4.6
Per Room
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, SociaZ Indicatokm: 1976 -
Annuat Housing Suwey, Paxt A, Genetat Housing Charactetitics (1976).
Note that the rooms counted include whole rooms used for living
purposes, such as living rooms, dining rooms, bedrooms, kitchens,
furnished attic or basement rooms, recreation rooms, permanently enclosed
porches suitable for year-round use, lodgers' rooms, and rooms used for
offices by a person living in the unit.
76
show a correlation between housing and the quality of schools, welfare,
fire and police protection. It was hypothesized that neighborhoods
consisting of poorer quality housing consumed more public services than
they contributed to the urban coffers.163 This hypothesis merely states
an obvious reality: Poor people consume as many, if not more, social
services as persons within higher income groups yet are unable to
contribute proportionate amounts in taxes as do members of this latter
class. This conclusion has nothing to do with housing quality. Instead,
the issue is one of incomes.
There have been numerous, later studies done which attempted to
link poor housing to maladies such as stress, poor self-perception,
lack of control over children, and family disorganization in general.
Perhaps one of the most famous of these studies was done by Alvin
Schorr, entitled S num4 and Social InzecuAity (1963). Although Schorr does
present some very persuasive arguments in favor of the proposition that
poor housing has a strong impact on the psychological well-being of the
individual and the family, he is forced to admit that there is a lack of
"solid evidence of a causal relationship between housing and health. ,164
In recognizing that a mere correlation between poor housing and physical
and mental health may not signal a causal relationship, Schorr targets
the difficulty of separating housing from a multitude of other
environmental and social factors as one of the major problems associated
with measuring the impact of housing on health. Thus, there is no clear
1 6 3Alonso, Hassid, Smith, upta note 153, at 11.
1 6 4 Schorr, SleumS and SociaL 1noecwurty 8 (1963).
77
evidence that improving housing quality, while holding all other factors
constant, will actually make poor people healthier.1 6 5
It must be concluded that society's choice of putting
money into housing rather than jobs, schools, direct
consumption, or research about housing is more attribu-
table to tradition in this area of income redistribution
and to the visibility of slums than to an objective
determination that this is a particularly effective form
of aid. 1 6 6
Although housing improved beyond a certain minimal health and
safety standard may not make tenants healthier, better housing may be
beneficial to tenants if they believe that such housing will improve their
general well-being. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that code
improvements are valued by tenants in an amount equivalent or in excess
of the rent increases which follow.
It should be clear that whenever the costs of a social program
exceed the benefits, continued administration of such a program makes
neither economic sense nor good social policy. In searching for some
justification for continuing our present housing code system, Hirsch
presents the following question:
Since tenants do pay the full costs in those situations
in which the program is a beneficial one, why have
tenants not volunteered to pay the higher costs in order
to receive these improvements in service? Or, to put it
differently, if habitability laws are to be regarded as
a socially desirable program for the poor, the costs to
the individual landlord must be smaller than the tenant's
evaluation of the benefits that the law provides. But,
if this is true, why have the parties not transacted
voluntarily, paying the landlord some amount greater
than his costs of improvement, but less than the tenant's
1 6 5Wood, Intt oduction to Houlsing: Facts and PRincipes 50 n.d.
166Alonso, Hassid, Smith, Luprta note 153, at 12.
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evaluation of the benefits, in order to make both
parties better off?l 6 7
Hirsch concludes that since tenants have not volunteered to pay for
code improvements, the benefits must be less than the costs.168 He
argues that tenants who value improved housing will make certain
sacrifices in other consumption areas so that they can afford better
housing. Although it is recognized that not all low income tenants will
be able to adjust their budgets in this fashion, the conclusion remains
"that indigent tenants are spending as much on housing as they consider
to be in their best interest."169 Thus, under the present system of
housing code administration, neither a housing effect nor an income
effect is achieved. 17 The result leaves all parties worse off. The
landlord is strapped with the burden of making improvements and takes
the risk that the costs he is forced to advance cannot be totally
recouped through rent increases, and the tenant is forced to pay for
improvements which he most likely neither values nor can afford.
2. The Value Issue
It has just been argued that above certain minimum standards, there
is no evidence that requiring better housing will improve peoples' lives.
1 6 7 Hirsch, 6up~ta note 20, at 44-5.
168id. at 45.
Id. at 59.
170 The housing effect requires tenants to pay only for the actual
value such improvements have in relation to their well-being while the
income effect allows a transfer of resources from landlords to tenants
by preventing the landlord from passing the costs of code improvement
to his tenants.
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But how do we determine even that minimum standard?
The concept of minimum standards is difficult to determine in
part because our values are constantly changing. These changing values
have been reflected in a continual upgrading of housing code standards.
For example, it was not until 1956 that New York City imposed central
heating as a general housing code requirement. Today, a unit without
.proper heating facilities would be considered substandard. 17 Similarly,
technological innovations have allowed our perceptions about conditions
which were once considered inadequate to change. Early observers
attacked dark, unventilated units as health hazards.172 Today, due to
the availability of electricity, rooms lacking natural light and open
air ventilation are not considered to be substandard.173 One New York
court, in recognizing the problems of changing standards expressed
the following:
Each owner of property and particularly of multi-tenanted
dwellings must . . . be deemed to have purchased . . .
with a consciousness of the possibility (if indeed, in
these volatile times, of the probability) that new
technological developments and sociological advances
would insistently and inescapably require the instal-
lation of newly perfected protections of life and limb.
1 7 4
17 1Gribetz and Grad, upa note 1, at 1268-9.
172Veiller, Teneient Houing Redoum in New Votk City, 1834-1900
in The Tenement Housing Problem 82 (DeForest and Veiller eds. 1903).
173Hawkes, Building Buk Legislation: Descltption and Analysis 8[ n.d.]
174 Peopte v. HacLpean 60 Misc.2d 873, 304 N.Y.S.2d 183, 188 (1969).
Housing code requirements have generally been held to be retro-
spective in their application. Therefore, the date of construction is not
relevant to the applicability of new code requirements. City o Chicago
v. AiLfeA 27 Ill.2d 211, 188 N.E.2d 694 (1963); Kauka" v. City o6 Chicago
27 Ill.2d 197, 188 N.E.2d 700 (1963).
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Housing standards are also culture bound. Many societies
throughout the world have housing conditions which by American standards
would be substandard yet which pose no serious questions or problems of
family living within those societies.175 Theoretically, if we are
concerned merely with minimal standards of health and safety, the
minimum housing standard would be free of any cultural bias and
instead would be an absolute standard based on minimal levels necessary
to preserve life and health. However, expectations developed within this
country have caused the definition of "minimal standards" to mean more
than the mere protection of health and safety. Therefore, American
housing must be judged by its adequacy within our system. The question
thus becomes: What group formulates our housing codes and to what extent
are their values reflected in the housing standards set forth?
In this country, it is the planner, architect, contractor, tradesman,
manufacturer of materials, politician and government official who
formulate housing standards. These people are generally members of the
middle or upper income groups and therefore it is the values of these
groups which are represented in housing codes. However, it is clear that
concepts of privacy, space, social contact and a variety of other
lifestyle factors important to housing structure and design differ
greatly, not only among people, but particularly among income groups.176
1 7 5 Glazer, zupILa note 160, at 159.
1 76Alonso, Hassid, Smith, SupLa note 153, at 7.
One study shows that low income persons consider proper room
temperature control, room size, exterior appearance and backyards to be
more important than features such as cross-ventilation, carports and
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If the poor do not desire certain living conditions which reflect
middle class values, then we are forcing the poor to pay for standards
which are not only of no benefit to them, but also which they can
rarely afford. Thus, our housing standards should relate not to the
desires of the middle classes, but instead to the minimally acceptable
177
standards of lower income groups. Members of other income groups can
then purchase housing which accommodates their values and which can be
provided through the marketplace, without need for government intervention.
Redefining our housing standards in a manner which corresponds to
the needs of the poor does not require that we readjust our culturally
based standards of acceptable living. Rather, it merely suggests that we
refrain from imposing middle class conceptions of habitability on all
groups within the society. Higher income groups are able to have their
living standards translated through the marketplace into housing which
meets their needs; lower income persons cannot. By imposing standards
which are higher than is desired or affordable by the poor, we are
leaving them without a choice.
3. Constitutional Considerations
In addition to the policy considerations which favor the reduction
of current housing codes to minimum standards, there are constitutional
questions which may arise where codes are found to reach beyond minimal
separate dining areas. Sanoff and Sawheny, Realdent-t& Liveability: A
Sociophysical PeApeetive 38 (1971).
1 7 7This assumes ofcourse that minimum health and safety objectives
will be met. Such an assumption is based on a belief that housing hazards,
which produce potential threats to life or safety, are not only wasteful
of human resources but also drain the public treasury.
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standards of housing enforceable under the police power.178 As
O'Bannon explains:
The primary intent of building regulations is to provide
reasonable controls for the construction, use, and
occupancy of buildings, and all of their various components.
Thus, such codes are minimum in nature, and under the
provision of the police power cannot tegoaty be made to
,*equiue constuction o6 a quality excessive o that which
is neceoaany to 6awnish a deg'tee o6 aJety. 17
Where codes are found to be more than minimum standards of health
and safety courts have not been reluctant to invalidate those provisions
which bear no relation to health or safety. For example, in Boden v.
City o4 Mfwaukee, 8 Wis.2d 318, 99 N.W.2d 156 (1959), the court found
that the relationship between public health and safety and the requirement
for exterior paint was too remote, if it existed at all, to allow
condemnation for its violation. Thus, the owner was allowed to pay a
fine for noncompliance rather than make the repair.180 A more recent
court has found that air conditioners do not constitute an "essential
service'" which landlords can be compelled to maintain. 181
1 7 8 Boggan, Housing Codao as a Means o6 Pceventing Uban BLight:
ConstitutionaL P!Loblem, 6 Wake Forest Law Review 255, 257 (1970).
1 7 9O'Bannon, 6upta note 2, at 10.
1 8 0See ado: Columbu v. Stubbs, 225 Ga. 765, 158 S.E.2d 393 (1967),
where the court struck down an order requiring a landlord to make repairs
including exterior painting, installation of at least two electrical out-
lets per room, heating in bathrooms, repairing of cracks in ceilings and
walls, and weatherproofing windows and doors. But see: B'beALan v.
Housing Autho)Lity o6 City o6 Ckanston, 112 'R.. 768, 315 A.2d 747 (1974).
1 8 1Samson Management Co 'p. v. Rei chman 63 Misc.2d 238, 309 N.Y.S.2d
838 (1970).
This case presents the interesting question of whether the courts
will view air conditioners as a necessity in the future.
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Although the courts are not in agreement as to what constitutes
minimum health and safety standards, it is clear that they do look with
skepticism upon regulations mandating repairs which promote solely
aesthetic goals. The police power has generally not been so broadly
defined as to include the regulation of conditions which are visually
offensive.182 However, a regulation which results in the elimination of
an unaesthetic condition will not be invalidated where the regulation also
has some purpose in promoting public health or safety goals. For example,
in Peopte v. Gkeene, 264 Cal.App.2d 774, 70 Cal.Rptr. 818 (1968), the
court allowed an ordinance requiring the clearing of trees, weeds and
unsightly growth from private property even though the purpose of the
regulation was not only to reduce fire hazards but also to preserve the
attractiveness of the neighborhood.1 8 3
1 8 2O'Bannon, aupta note 2, at 10.
183 See also: Thain v. City o6 Pato Atto, 207 Cal.App.2d 173, 24
Cal.Rptr. 515 (1962), where a city ordinance requiring owners to remove
weeds from the premises and adjacent sidewalks or streets was ruled to be
valid.
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VIII. A PROPOSAL: A MINIMUM CODE CERTIFICATION PROGRAM
WITH PRIVATE CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS FOR
ADDITIONAL HOUSING QUALITY
A. HOW AND WHY IT WORKS
Before we blindly follow those who advocate new cures, we must move
cautiously to avoid selecting reforms which are merely old methods
disguised with new labels. As a first step, we must define our goals.
If we value quality housing over the costs of providing such housing, then
our strategy must be different than if we are concerned with housing
costs and the restraints it creates on the freedom of tenants to make
consumption decisions.
The first goal requires a maximum standard housing code. Yet,
there are a variety of reasons why the current system of maximum standard
housing codes has failed to produce "better" housing. Some of these
failures are inherent to the concept of housing codes and some are
generated by present methods of code enforcement. First, there are a
myriad of administrative, political, legal and economic problems which
threaten the efficacy of present enforcement procedures. Second, the
current concept of maximum standard housing codes is inherently
defective in that it allows certain groups, particularly the construction
and materials industries, to improperly benefit from the implementation
of specific code requirements. And third, the current system of
government-defined standards seems hopelessly hindered by our inability
to develop standards which are valued by all who must pay for them.
The second strategy therefore becomes not only the most feasible
alternative but the most beneficial one as well. Recognizing that it is
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unrealistic to assume that any system of code maintenance can be carried
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out without some form of administrative or enforcement mechanism, an
appropriate reform measure should attempt to reduce reliance on an
elaborate enforcement mechanism while at the same time provide for
market-defined standards of housing quality which allow tenants to pay
only for those housing services which they value and are willing and
able to pay for. The institution of a minimum housing code certification
program with reliance on private contractual rights to provide additional
housing quality offers the means to achieve both these goals.
The certification of residential properties is not a new concept.
However, certification requirements have been generally limited to
special forms of multi-unit dwellings such as hotels and lodging or
rooming houses.185 Each of the model building codes includes a
procedure for the periodic inspection of all required safety and
sanitation requirements.186 Yet, some cities require certification only
under certain conditions, e.g., in advance of reoccupancy when property
is transferred, a new mortgage is issued, or when property has been
completely vacated.187 Thus, the use of certification to provide
continuous supervision of basic health and safety requirements in all
existing structures has not been implemented on a broad scale.
1 8 4Even within a perfect society where all landlords wish to
comply wiht code requirements, some mechanism is needed to check for in-
advertent violations and to guide landlords in their attempts to comply.
18 5Slavet and Levin, New Apptoacheu to Houlsing Code Administltation
in U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems, Research Report No. 17 (1969).
1 8 6Taylor, Supta note 11, at 31.
1 8 7Slavet and Levin, 6upAa note 185, at 46.
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Under a certification program, each multiple family dwelling unit
would be required to comply with minimum housing code requirements.18 8
Without certification, the building could not operate.189 Thus, the
tenant who is unable or unwilling to pay for housing which is maintained
in a level above this minimum code is not required to do so, yet he is
afforded the protection of a certificate of operation. Although, in
theory, no unit should operate without a certificate, a tenant can be
guaranteed that the unit does comply by merely requesting to see the
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certificate prior to renting the premises.
Beyond certification, a landlord is required by law to do nothing
more than maintain his building at a level which lives up to certification
requirements. Thereafter, the burden is on the tenant, as a consumer,
to contract for additional housing quality. The contract could be
incorporated into a standard lease form. Under this contract, the
landlord would be required to state his current and future obligation to
comply with minimum code provisions and then itemize those additional housing
1 8 8Certification should be for a fixed period - renewable upon
reinspection and verification of compliance.
1 8 9Although this appears to be a harsh penalty, it is not since
certification relates only to minimum code requirements with which most
landlords presently comply. Moreover, for those landlords who do not
currently comply, a leeway period should be allowed to enable them to
comply without a total shutdown of operations. A compliance period would
not only enable landlords who are able to comply to do so, but it would
also protect tenants from premature evictions due to closings for non-
compliance. Buildings for which compliance is financially infeasible
should be removed from the market altogether.
It is recognized that city-wide certification would be a gradual
process. Perhaps its initial implementation should occur on a district-
wide rather than city-wide basis. Where even district-wide certification
is not initially feasible, a voluntary certification program could be
instituted until compulsory certification is possible.
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services which he intends to provide. Both landlords and tenants will
be apprised of their rights and obligations under the contract at the
time in which they enter into the agreement. Once a breach occurs, a
civil suit for damages may be brought.
A strategy which focuses upon minimum levels of health and safety
in housing reduces to a minimum the opportunities which current failures
have to corrupt the system by relying on a market-defined standard of
housing quality. Above these minimum levels of housing service required
by the code, people are free to choose whatever level of housing for
which they are both willing and able to pay. Although the proposal does
provide an opportunity for the reduction of our reliance on current
enforcement mechanisms, it requires some degree of government intervention.
Thus, the question immediately arises: If this minimum code certification
program requires some type of enforcement mechanism and if comprehensive
enforcement of this system cannot be achieved, aren't we back where we
started? The simple answer is no, because the minimum code certification
191To prevent landlords from including housing services which
should not properly be considered in determining housing price, the
landlord's list should be limited to a category of housing services
developed by the municipality which add to the increased habitability
of a unit.
It is also possible that higher levels of certification can be
implemented. Thus, for a fee paid to the locality, so as not to create
an additional public burden for what is essentially a private benefit,
a landlord could get a certificate of "high quality" if he meets a given
set of housing standards which exceed minimum standards. Arguably,
the potential for graft with this "high quality" certificate is great.
However, the benefit to the tenant, i.e., a guarantee by a technical
expert that the landlord's representations are correct, thereby reducing
the burden on the tenant to discover and check for himself any discrepan-
cies, should warrant consideration of its implementation.
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program, unlike the present system, has a constituency.
Returning to the Ackerman-Komesar debate, tenants would benefit
if Ackerman were correct and rents did not in fact rise with the
imposition of code enforcement. Conversely, landlords benefit if they
are able to pass on the costs of code improvement to tenants as Komesar
predicts. In reality, both tenants and landlords believe in the results
reached by the Komesar analysis. Thus, tenants fearing an increase in
rents do not want code enforcement,192 while landlords are indifferent
at best to the prospect of code enforcement. Therefore, the present
system has no constituency. All other things remaining equal, neither
tenants nor landlords will benefit.
In contrast, a minimum housing code will have a constituency.
Except for basic standards, landlords do not have to bring their
properties into compliance with code requirements for which their
tenants are unable or unwilling to pay. Without the threat of rising rents,
occupancy rates will remain stable 193 and landlords will not risk
being unable to recoup code improvement costs by an inability to raise
rents sufficiently or to attract higher rent paying tenants. Similarly,
tenants will benefit from a minimum code since it provides them with the
opportunity to choose between increasing their housing consumption or
increasing their consumption of other goods.
1 9 2Tenants will only favor code improvement if the increase in
rents is less than the benefit which they receive from such improvements.
1 9 3Landlords will not have to fear falling occupancy rates or
incur the transaction costs associated with a shifting of tenants -
i.e., a movement out of tenants who cannot afford rent increases and a
movement in of those who can.
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Some may argue that reliance on the market enforcement of housing
quality will lead to housing which is unsanitary, uninhabitable and
unaesthetic. However, the minimum code certification program with
private contractual rights does not suggest that minimum standards of
health, sanitation and safety need not be met. Such standards continue
to be important not only for the individual but for the protection of the
community as well against preventable disease and fire and safety
hazards. Moreover, the market itself has generally insured that certain
housing basics are provided. Usually, housing requirements are not
incorporated into the housing code until the market is already providing
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such services on a widespread basis. And, it is doubtful whether
many landlords, even in the absence of code regulations, would offer
units which fail to provide even minimal plumbing and sanitary facilities,
since most of even the lowest quality housing already meets these
standards. As one court notes:
Economic self interest - the incentive to obtain the
higher rentals which might be exacted of those able and
willing to pay adequately for increased comfort and
safety - would doubtless, be a force sufficient, even
without legislative compulsion, to induce the erection
of some buildings which would embody the latest improve-
ments and the most advanced ideas in safety and
construction.195
1 9 4DeForest and Veiller, The Tenement House Poblem, in The
Tenement House Problem 24 (DeForest and Veiller eds. 1903).
There are very practical reasons for this phenomenon. If a
municipal housing code were to suddenly mandate a requirement for which
a large proportion of the housing stock was in noncompliance, the total
costs of compliance would be prohibitive. Moreover, it is likely that
landlords would either fight for its repeal or refuse to comply.
Peope v. HatpeAn, 6up.ta note 174, at 185-6.
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The minimum code becomes important only "where economic self-interest
ceases to be a sufficiently potent force for the promotion of the general
welfare, or, indeed, becomes a force which may actually injure the
general welfare."196 At this point, regulations are required to insure
that "tenement houses or multiple dwellings shall conform to minimum
standards which may be reasonably regarded as essential for safe, decent,
and sanitary dwelling places." 1 9 7
B. MINIMUM CODE REQUIREMENTS -
BASIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CRITERIA
The certification of minimum code compliance requires a definition
of "minimum standards". Although we have an abundance of elaborate
federal regulations and model, state and local housing codes which set
forth maintenance and occupancy standards, no clear concept of minimum
health and safety can be derived from this broad array of legislative
material. The U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems conducted a
comparative analysis of the four model housing codes, nine state housing
codes, and sixteen city or county-housing codes. The goal of this study
'was to determine whether a consistent definition of substandard housing
could be found throughout this sample. The Commission's findings were
not surprising:
[T]hese standards showed that there are wide variations
among them, that they are often in conflict; that the
variations are so great that by definition they could not
be based on scientific or objective standards; that many
provisions are couched in subjective language - "adequate",
1 9 6 Id. at 186.
197id
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"in safe condition", or "in good repair"; that many
of the objective standards are based on a combination
of tradition, rule of thumb, or personal experience;
and that they differ in emphasis from structure to
health, depending upon the code adopted.198
With similar difficulty the courts have grappled with a definition
of substandard housing. The need for a precise definition of minimum
housing requirements became even more critical with the development of
.the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability. An attempt to reach
such a definition was made by the court in Javin6 v. FlAAt Nationat
ReaZtty Cotpokation:
Where American city dwellers, both rich and poor,
seek "shelter" today, they seek a well known package
of goods and services - a package which includes not
merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat,
light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities,
secure windows and proper maintenance.199
However, the improvement of housing defects such as malfunctioning
venetian blinds, water leaks, wall cracks and a lack of painting were
called "amenities" by another court and therefore were not included
within the category of "uninhabitability".200
In the final analysis, we find that the definition of substandard
198U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems, lupta note 7, at 277.
See: gnetU : Sutermeister, Inadequacie and Inconsistencies
in the Dedinition og Substandakd HouSing, U.S. National Commission on
Urban Problems, Research Report No. 19 (1966).
199428 7F.2d 1071, 1074.
2 0 0 Academy SpiLAes, Inc. v. Bown 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970).
See atso: Geen v. SupeAiot Cout, 10 Cal.3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168,
111 Cal.Rptr. 704 (1974), where habitability was defined as "substantial
compliance with those applicable building and housing code standards
which materially affect health and safety."
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housing is a highly variable one and is dependent in large part upon
community values as to what the level is below which housing quality
must not fall. Unfortunately, subjective formulations of substandard
housing have led to overbroad, ineffective and frequently unenforceable
maximum codes. What is needed is a return to a more objective definition
of substandard housing which is rooted in basic health and safety
requirements.
The development of a minimum housing code derived soltly from
basic human requirements of health and safety requires an evaluation
of the relationship between housing characteristics and health and safety.
Ideally, such an evaluation would be based on the most current and
accurate scientific information available concerning this relationship.
Unfortunately, much about the impact which the built-environment has
upon man's physical and psychological well-being remains unknown.
The most comprehensive information on this subject is contained
within Basic HeaLth Pinciples o6 Hou4ing and its Envitonment which was
prepared by the American Public Health Association (APHA) in 1971. This
study is based upon an earlier edition first published by the APHA in
1938, entitled BaSic PAlciples o6 HealhttL Howing. This 1971 study,
as well as the earlier version, are not restricted to mere health and
safety considerations. Instead, each includes several chapters relating
to the psychological needs of people and the importance of the physical
environment in meeting these needs. However, most of these psychological
factors are ambiguous and the validity of such provisions is unclear.
For example, included within the list is the "Provision of opportunities
for normal family life" (1938), and "Design, facilities, surroundings,
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and maintenance to produce a sense of mental well-being" (1971). The
concepts of "normal family life" and "mental well-being" are left
undefined and virtually no scientific evidence is offered to support
their importance. Similarly, little guidance is given on how to fulfill
these mandates.
If these psychological criteria are omitted, the APHA studies
do provide a guide for outlining those characteristics of housing which
are important to the promotion of the fundamental physiological needs of
people. These needs can best be categorized under two headings:
Health and Sanitation Maintenance, and Safety and Injury Prevention.
Health and Sanitation Maintenance
1. Shelter Against the Elements: This requirement is concerned with
the structural soundness of the dwelling unit. To provide minimum
conditions, each unit must provide adequate protection against the
elements: cold, heat, wind, rain, snow, and other severe weather
conditions. Since climatic conditions vary among regions, the
degree of protection and the methods required to provide such
protection will necessarily differ in accordance with these
regional climatic variations.
2. Maintenance of a Controlled Thermal Environment: This requirement
is inextricably related to the requirement of structural soundness.
In essence, the maintenance of a controlled thermal environment
requires that the structure be protected against the extremes of
heat and cold. At a minimum it "calls for reasonable nonconductivity
of walls, ceiling, and floor, and an appropriate means of
supplying the amount of artificial heat in winter and the local
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climate demands." 20 1 The converse requires that adequate cooling
through either natural ventilation or artificial means be available.
3. Acceptable Levels of Indoor Air Quality: It is recognized that many
air pollutants are caused by external sources and are thus beyond
the control of the individual landlord. Therefore, the requirement
of indoor air quality is not concerned with factory, automotive or
other harmful environmental exhausts. Nor is it concerned with air
contaminants caused by the tenant himself such as cigarette smoke
and aerosol sprays. Instead, indoor air quality requires the
provision of proper ventilation systems and the proper installation
and maintenance of heating and cooking facilities to prevent
dangerous concentrations of smoke, noxious fumes, and carbon
monoxide.
4. Design and Maintenance to Exclude and Facilitate the Control of
Rodents and Insects: Because rodents and insects are carriers of
diseases and infections which affect human health, it is important
that housing be designed and maintained in a manner which reduces
to a minimum the infiltration of vermin.
5. Provision of a Sanitary Water Supply: Basic health and sanitation
requires that a pure drinking water supply be provided within each
dwelling unit.
6. Provision of Sanitary Bathroom Facilities: There has been considerable
controversy over whether bathroom facilities, particularly a bathtub,
shower and sink, is necessary to promote health and safety. The APHA
2 0 1Wood, 6upCaa note 165, at 29.
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concludes that such requirements are basic to "adequate personal
and household hygiene.''202 A similar debate surrounds the issue of
whether both hot and cold water need be provided. While it may be
argued that the absence of hot water does not in itself pose a
serious threat to health or safety, the benefits which hot water may
have in encouraging personal hygiene and houshold sanitation may
warrant its inclusion in the list of basic health requirements. At
any rate, the provision of sanitary bathroom facilities requires
that such facilities be part of a plumbing and drainage system which
is designed, installed and maintained to protect against contamination,
leakage, stoppage, overflows and the escape of noxious odors.
7. Facilities for the Sanitary Preparation and Disposal of Food: Where
a kitchen is provided, facilities should include a sink with hot
and cold water and a proper system for the disposal of food wastes
which protects the unit from the breeding and spreading of insects
and rodents.
Safety and Injury Prevention
1. Maintenance of Structural Stability: The building code is designed to
insure that the dwelling unit is constructed in a structurally
sound manner. Periodic monitoring is necessary to insure that the
building can withstand anticipated environmental impacts. Therefore,
continued maintenance of structural safety should be mandated through
the housing code. It should be noted that minimum structural safety
20 2American Public Health Association, Bazic Health Ptinciplez
o6 Howsing and It6 Envi/tonment 25 (1971).
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requirements will vary according to the environmental hazards
present within a particular area. For example, in the west,
concern over seismic safety will necessitate stricter standards than
would be required in areas where the potential for major earthquake
damage is not very great.
2. Maintenance of Fire Safety: Provisions regarding the construction,
installation and materials necessary to minimize fire hazards are
contained within the building or fire code. Comprehensive codes
relating to fire prevention design and construction have been
developed by several groups including the American Insurance
Association which developed the National Building Code.203 It is
the function of the housing code to insure that these basic building
and fire code requirements are maintained in working order.
3. Control of Hazardous Materials: As the industry becomes more
sophisticated in its methods for testing the health and safety
aspects of building materials, some materials which have been
applied on a wide scale in the past may prove to pose serious health
or safety hazards. The connection traced between lead-based paint
and lead poisoning in children is a grim example of how our ignorance
about building materials may develop into a serious health problem.
It is essential that materials which have proven to cause serious
health conditions be explicitly banned.204
2 0 3These codes include requirements such as fire stops, automa-
tic sprinkler systems, and the provision of adequate fire exits.
204See: Appendix A, p. 114, for a translation of these basic
health and safety principles into a Proposed Minimum Housing Code.
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This list of basic health and safety requirements covers a
significantly narrower class of housing characteristics than is generally
found within a local housing code. Perhaps the most significant
exclusion, here, is that of occupancy standards. Occupancy standards are
frequently calculated by the "minimum density function of persons per
room, including all rooms in the house, minus bathrooms, or as number
1,205
of persons per sleeping room." Overcrowding is usually set at the
point where person per room rates equal or exceed 1.5.
Although overcrowding is not generally cited as a major cause
of health or safety hazards, occupancy standards are frequently included
within the municipal housing code. Overcrowding is claimed to be linked
to stress, anti-social behavior, and poor study habits in children.
However, no strong empirical data is available to validate such claims. 2 0 6
One observer, in commenting on the difficulty of measuring the impacts
of overcrowding, states that the "[h]azard costs from overcrowding are
long term in impact and psychological in nature and are thus exceedingly
,207
difficult to monetize." Measurement of the impacts of overcrowding
is also difficult to accomplish because overcrowding may be just one
factor which contributes to psychological problems and family disorganiza-
tion.208 Occupancy standards are also difficult to enforce because it is
2 0 5Greenfield and Lewis, An Afternative to a Density Function
Dedinition o6 OveActwoding in Housing in Urban America 167 (Pynoos ed.
(1973).
20 6Alonso, supta note 153, at 11.
2 0 7Abbott, SupiLa note 19, at 122.
2 0 8American Public Health Association, aupka note 202, at 170;
Glazer, 6upta note 160, at 163-4.
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hard to determine how many persons are actually residing within a given
;209
unit. Therefore, since the impact of overcrowding on physical or
mental health remains largely unproven, "a basis is lacking for overruling
the preferences of housing consumers who would rather be overcrowded by
forcing them instead to pay increased rents or move to cheaper and
doubtless more deteriorated units in order to meet occupancy limits." 2 1 0
C. WHAT THIS PROPOSED REFORM
CAN AND CANNOT DO
1. Successes
Except for major deficiencies, it is doubtful whether the average
low income tenant considers the habitability of a dwelling unit. Instead,
he is concerned with finding affordable housing. "Either he is evicted
from or he has abandoned a prior uninhabitable apartment, and he must
house his family as soon as possible."211 The minimum housing code
addresses this problem of affordable housing. The tenant is protected
only to the extent of minimal levels of health and safety. While those
tenants who desire better housing and who are able to afford it, will be
protected by contractual rights. In short, the minimum code certification
program with private contractual rights for additional housing quality
provides the best of both worlds. It allows for the deregulation of
housing code standards in favor of private market incentives yet it also
2 0 9 Abbott, Supta note 19, at 122.
210Id
211Garrity, Redes5igning Landtotd-Tenant Law 6o an Uban Society
in Housing in Urban America 76 (Pynoos ed. 1973).
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insures, through the certification process, that no unit falls below
those standards necessary to protect life and health.
Implicit in the present system of housing codes is an assumption
that the poor are unable to make wise choices about the consumption of
their limited resources. This view is not only an incorrect one, but
also a paternalistic one. There is nothing to suggest that poor people
are less capable of choosing between various consumer goods than persons
with higher incomes. To be equitable, we should devise a system which
controls everyone's freedom of consumption (clearly not a democratic
view) or control no one's. Under the present proposal, tenants will be
allowed to rearrange their budgets in a fashion which maximizes their
enjoyment, without government interference.
In addition to the fact that a minimum code certification
program with private contractual rights would provide benefits to both
tenants and landlords, this scheme also eliminates some of the underlying
failures associated with the present system. By its very nature, this
system dispenses with the problem.of inappropriate standards since
.housing quality is defined not by an individual group of officials but
rather by the market. In this way, each consumer defines what level of
quality is adequate for his needs and budget. Similarly, the problem of
improper beneficiaries is reduced since, because standards are kept to a
minimum, the construction industry will not be encouraged to lobby for
provisions aimed solely at promoting certain materials and labor methods.
Although the construction industry will continue to benefit from housing
improvements, the opportunity for the promotion of improper standards
will be substantially reduced.
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The minimum code certification program with contractual rights
proposal also enables us to avoid some of the systemic failures of the
enforcement mechanism which presently exist.
Constitutional Questions. The concept of a minimum code is
virtually free from the equal protection arguments associated with
selective enforcement schemes and the constitutional considerations
raised where codes mandate standards which bear little or no relation to
health and safety. Moreover, the contractual component of the proposal
is premised upon the private right to contract and therefore is limited
only by contractual notions of adequacy of consideration and fairness in
bargaining.
Inadequate Enforcement Mechanisms. The substitution of present
housing codes with a simple minimum standard code will dramatically
decrease the amount of money and manpower presently necessary to enforce
housing codes. Except for basic requirements, standards are voluntary.
Therefore, there is no need for elaborate patrolling and punishment
mechanisms.
A reduction in our reliance on complex administrative and
enforcement systems not only produces cost savings but also abandons the
perspective that noncompliance with present maximum standard housing
codes is a crime. Currently, some landlords are being punished or are in
fear of being punished for violating standards for which there is no
real victim.212 Tenants can be considered victims only to the extent
21 2 Potential victims are created only where housing is maintained
at a level which threatens health or safety.
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that they are forced to pay for services which they do not necessarily
value.
Administrative and Political Obstacles. No system which requires
government intervention can be totally void of administrative and
political inefficiencies.213 However, a system which relies primarily
on private, voluntary methods of enforcement allows for a reduction of
reliance on government intervention and thus minimizes the opportunity
for n;ome administrative and political abuses. Moreover, the costs of
bureaucratic delays will be reduced under a system which does not require
extensive administrative procedures.
The Cost of Compliance. Under a minimum code, the financial
problems associated with compliance are virtually eliminated for the
majority of landlords. Standards are so minimal that few landlords
would not already be in compliance or would be required to make only
minor repairs to bring their properties up to code.
Admittedly, the minimum code certification scheme is aimed at
relieving the present economic burden of landlords forced to comply with
housing codes which exceed basic levels of quality. There is, however,
that class of landlords who would be faced with a tremendous burden, or
the alternative of abandonment, in the wake of minimum code enforcement.
2 1 3Although the implementation of a new system will give way to
new types of enforcement and administrative procedures, unless we
feel comfortable with no government intervention or spend inordinate
amounts of time and money in supervision, some failures will continue
to exist since no system existing within the present political structure
can escape all of the traditional abuses inherent within the democratic
process.
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Landlords who cannot afford minimum standard maintenance and repair costs
are not helped by the minimum code. In situations where it is economically
infeasible or inefficient to bring a building up to basic code condition,
such a structure should be targeted for conversion to some more efficient
use or demolished.
The Economic Reality of Nonenforcement. By eliminating the
enforcement of housing codes which meet optimal levels of health and
safety, rent increases are avoided for those low income tenants who are
most in need of affordable housing. Since the supply of housing,
currently labeled "sub-code" yet sufficient in terms of health and safety
protections, is not reduced through code enforcement, a shortage is
avoided and those tenants who can afford only substandard housing are
protected against enforcement-induced rent increases.
Finally, the market consequences which either force evasion of the
law by government officials or encourage violations of it by profit-
minded landlords are minimized. Since the failure to make improvements
above minimum code levels will no longer be considered a violation of the
law, government officials will not be placed in the awkward position of
ignoring code violations where they know that code enforcement would
only serve to raise rents. Similarly, landlords who do not wish to
maintain their properties at levels above minimum health and safety
requirements will not be required to do so. However, neither will they
benefit from their ability to avoid code improvement costs because such
costs will not be imposed on other landlords either.
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2. The Issue of Tenant Responsibility
Transforming housing quality into a contractual relationship
requires tenant responsibility. Yet this may not be such a bad thing.
Today, tenants make many incorrect assumptions about the housing code
enforcement process and the protections it offers. When in fact, due to
the current enforcement process, which is generally selective at best
and nonexistent at worst, present housing codes are not providing tenants
with the protections which they believe exist. The contractual scheme
removes tenants from this false sense of security. Tenants will be
required, as are all other consumers, to make sure that the product
meets their expectations. For example, a purchaser of a new car is
afforded certain protections under government controls which insure that
the car meets basic safety standards. However, beyond this, each
purchaser has the burden of selecting the car with the desired level of
"extras" at a price at which he is willing to pay. The same principle
should be applied to the housing industry.
I will concede that the tenant does not have the 'technical
expertise to analyze structural soundness and other technical factors
which concern habitability. Most tenants do not presently know whether
their buildings meet code standards and, with improper enforcement, many
defects probably go unnoticed. Under this proposal, minimum code
requirements will insure that conditions which threaten health or safety
do not exist. Therefore, it will be unnecessary for the tenant to
acquire the skills to check for major health or safety violations. Yet,
tenants do have the skills to inspect for amenity conditions. Services
and conditions which presently distinguish a low-rent unit from a high-
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rent unit are certainly visible to the common tenant. This is how the
market currently works. A landlord would be unable to rent a unit for
$400 per month unless the tenant were able to readily ascertain the
additional housing services which such a unit offers as compared with
a lower priced unit. The expectation of maintenance levels and amenities
are quite different in a $400 per month unit and a $40 per month unit.
The landlord of the $400 unit would continue to maintain his building
at a level desired and expected by his tenants even in the absence of
code enforcement. Otherwise, he would risk losing tenants.
In short, the government should protect all tenants against
conditions which threaten health or safety. Yet, beyond this, tenants,
as consumers, should be accountable for their own welfare. Unfortunately,
placing a substantial part of the burden for code enforcement on tenants
is not without its problems. Certainly, some tenants will be negligent
in securing and protecting their rights under a private landlord-tenant
contract.214 However, granting new responsibilities to tenants, who are
concerned with the opportunity to choose housing consumption levels,
frees them from reliance upon the adequacy of the government administra-
tive process to promote their best interests.
Along with tenant responsibility, the proposal also provides the
tenant with protections which are currently available to him under our
present housing code system. Through the certification process, all
tenants will be granted the protections of a minimum housing code.
2 1 4 Reliance on private enforcement of housing quality requires
some form of public education so that tenants, as well as landlords,
are made aware of their rights and obligations under this system.
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Neither the landlord nor the tenant can insulate himself from the
minimum housing code through a contractual relationship.215 Landlords
have generally been denied the right to collect rents from tenants who
216leased units which were in violation of housing regulations. Moreover,
the freedom to contract for services above minimal levels of health and
safety is not absolute. The liberty to contract is limited not only by
the police power but also by notions of fair dealing - free from fraud,
deception and undue influence.
It is conceivable that some landlords may attempt to take
advantage of the tenant whose ability to contract is impaired by age,
mental incompetence or physical handicaps. Special protections, perhaps
in the form of harsh penalties for landlords who take advantage of those
who are not in a position of equal bargaining, should be applied. It is
also recognized that in times of short housing supply, the ability of
the tenant to bargain for additional services may be more limited.
However, this is a problem of housing supply which can only be cured by
215It is well accepted that a statute which governs the maintenance
of health and safety standards cannot be invalidated simply because enforce-
ment of the statute requires the impairment of contractual relationships.
In 300 W. 154th St. Reatty Co. v. Dept. o6 Buitding, 55 Misc.2d 37,
284 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1967), the court upheld a statute which compelled
repairs in leased premises which where reasonably directed toward
eliminating a health nuisance and correcting the problem of substandard
housing, even though such an action might impair the obligation of the
landlord's contract. This case was affirmed, 30 A.D.2d 351, 292 N.Y.S.2d
25 (1968), but later modified, 260 N.E.2d 534, 311 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1970),
to disallow withholding of rents in excess of repair costs.
See also: Manhattan Cub v. Landmazs PAesexuation Comm'n o6 Ciy
o6 New Vo'dk, 51 Misc.2d 556, 273 N.Y.S.2d 848, 852 (1966).
2 1 6 Hirsch, 6upta note 20, at 18.
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increases in the housing stock and not by any mechanism which tampers
with the landlord's right to set prices freely. 2 1 7
In recognizing the potential for unequal bargaining power between
landlords and tenants under the contractual rights scheme, the economic
disadvantage which low income tenants face under this proposal cannot be
ignored. Implicit in these arguments in favor of contractual rights is
a recognition that, although in-kind transfers of housing subsidies are
infeasible, general income subsidies are not only feasible but necessary
to increase the bargaining and purchasing power of those currently unable
to pay for minimum code housing without a substantial sacrifice in their
consumption of other necessary goods.
3. The Problem of Discretion
This minimum code differs from the traditional housing code in
that it does not prescribe the specific manner in which health and
safety standards must be met. For example, there are no requirements
that each room have a minimum number of windows, that the heating unit
provide for a room temperature above a certain level, or that specific
materials be used. Codes which detail quantities, dimensions, materials
and methods of assembly are called "specification codes".
In contrast, codes which prescribe objectives to be accomplished
rather than specific methods or materials are called "performance
codes". Often language used in performance codes includes terms such as
2 1 7The application of rent control in such a situation would only
serve to exacerbate some of the problems already associated with a
tight housing market such as anticipatory rent increases and decreases
in maintenance and repairs.
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"reasonable" or "adequate". Such language allows broad discretion on
the part of owners, contractors, designers and code enforcers to select
the methods and materials which will achieve the goals of the code. In
this way, performance codes can be tailored to the unique features of a
given building, neighborhood, or environmental condition. Moreover, the
performance code is more easily adaptable to changes in technological
methods and moral and political values.
While some argue that the use of performance codes encourages
"healthy and competitive innovation",2 1 8 others see performance codes as
a threat to the efficacy of code enforcement. Specification codes are
favored by those who contend that the vagueness and indefiniteness of
performance standards increases the difficulty of criminal prosecution.
Moreover, such critics also claim that the broad discretion allowed the
code inspector under a performance code leads to confusion as to what
constitutes compliance and facilitates discriminatory application of
the code.2 19
Where housing laws are imprecise or the language used is vague
or indefinite, such standards may be constitutionally impermissible as
an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. This rule does not
however require the elimination of all discretion on the part of local
officials in setting the boundaries of housing standards. It does
require that where such discretion is allowed the limits of this
218 O'Bannon, 6upta note 2, at 89.
2 1 9Parratt, 6upta note 25, at 148-9.
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discretion is clearly set forth.2 2 0  In zichaAd v. City o 4 Columbia,
227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955), the Supreme Court of South Carolina
found that certain provisions of the housing ordinance were invalid in
that they did not contain a "sufficiently definite standard or yardstick"
and thus constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority.221 However, other courts have been less willing to find a
transgression of this limitation even in cases where the standards are
anything but clear. For example, in Pet~ahanky v. State, 182 Md. 162,
32 A.2d 696 (1943), a Maryland court found that a housing standard refer-
ring to the elimination of "filth" was not impermissibly vague since the
court failed to see how "filth could be classified, graduated or
standardized except as filth."
Although performance codes are not invalid per se, the potential
for an abuse of discretion under such codes is a recognized threat to the
workability of these statutes. Unfortunately, the problem of discretion
is present in almost every regulatory scheme. Where the regulations are
extremely narrow, a person may fitd it more cost efficient to bribe the
'regulatory official than to comply with the terms of the statute. In
contrast, where the regulatory scheme affords the enforcement official
2 2 0 O'Bannon, aSupta note 2, at 490.
2 2 1The regulations in question provided the following:
A dwelling or dwelling unit is unfit for human habitation if
conditions existing in such dwelling or dwelling unit are dangerous or
injurious to the health, safety or morals of the occupants of such dwel-
ling or dwelling unit, the occupants of neighboring dwellings or other
residents of the City . . . or if there are defects therein increasing the
hazards of fire, accident, or other calamities, conditions making the
structure unsafe, unsanitary, or failing to provide for decent living or
which are likely to cause sickness or disease. 88 S.E.2d 683, 686.
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broad discretion in finding violations, the official may demand a bribe
before he certifies compliance. Where codes encourage code enforcement
officials to demand bribes, there is at least some incentive on the part
of landlords to report these attempted extortions. In the former
situation, however, there is no need for either the landlord or the
code inspector to report the infraction since both benefit from the
abuse.
Perhaps some may view a system which encourages the landlord to
offer a bribe to be less offensive than one which allows the code
enforcement official to demand money from the landlord. Nevertheless,
since the potential for abuse exists in both instances, the choice
between either a maximum code or a minimum code should not be determined
by the relative degree of discretion allowed in either scheme. This is
not to suggest that the problem of abuse should not be addressed. It
merely suggests that the problem should be reflected in administrative
and enforcement mechanisms designed to minimize these abuses and should
222
not be an overriding factor in choosing among basic policy alternatives.
D. THE FUTURE
It appears that our efforts to provide every family with a decent
home through code enforcement have actually harmed those toward which
these efforts were directed. Hirsch best summarizes the failure as follows:
2 2 2The ultimate solution may lie in increasing the quality and
salaries of code enforcement officials through more rigorous qualifying
requirements and increased municipal appropriations to code enforcement
agencies. Additionally, the availability of appellate review procedures
with harsh penalties for code inspectors who abuse the system might aid
in deterring and punishing abusers.
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Attempts to deal with the housing quality problem
via legal sanctions alone cannot hope to be entirely
successful. Rents tend to increase, and . . . given
that indigent tenants do pay at least part of the
cost increase, it is possible that they end up worse
off than before habitability laws were enforced.
Some may not avoid living in substandard conditions. 2 2 3
Substandard housing has never been a goal nor is it a goal under
the minimum code certification program with contractual rights proposal. 2 2 4
Obviously, the ultimate goal is quality housing for all. However, the
private market has not freely entered into the lowest segmetiL of the
market since profitability is limited at best. Moreover, the public
sector has been ineffective in producing enough public housing and
alternative forms of housing subsidies for the poor. Thus, the problem
of "bad housing" may be one of. "not enough housing". In which case, the
long term answer is to increase the supply of low income housing225
through economic incentives for private sector production with support
through public sector construction.
At present, however, we are faced with the reality that many of
the poor live in inadequate housing.226 The minimum housing code
2 2 3Hirsch, 5up,1La note 20, at 62.
2 2 4 Similarly, the minimum code certification program with contract-
ual rights does not ignore the fact that there is a class of housing
which is dangerous and where the imposition of code improvement costs
would be economically inefficient. Such housing should be removed from
the housing market completely.
A more ambitious solution is to decrease the number of persons
with low incomes by providing employment and training opportunities.
2 2 6Landlords provide substandard housing either because they have
no choice, since the location and/or present condition of their buildings
make them rentable only to persons with low incomes, or they are able
111
attempts to bring such properties up to basic health and safety
requirements. Yet, at the same time, it recognizes that more stringent
controls, while perhaps socially desirable, can actually be counter-
productive by forcing needed units off the market. Thus, the most
immediate solution (until sufficient supplies of low rent housing can be
produced to meet current demand) is to create a system where, although
the poor may be living in substandard (but not dangerous) housing,
they are required to pay only the competitive market price for such
housing. Therefore, tenants who wish better housing may increase their
housing consumption relative to other goods. Yet those who do not value
housing quality as much as other goods, are free to reduce their
consumption of housing services to a minimum level.
The implementation of a minimum standard housing code marks a
policy choice between quality housing and the need for maintaining
housing supply. It is in no way suggested as a permanent solution; it is
an interim measure only. It must be realized that no one program can
singularly reverse a pattern of blight which has taken decades to
.develop. The establishment of minimum standards of health and safety will
not insure "a decent home and suitable living environment for every
American family" as mandated by the Housing Act of 1949.227 Minimum
standards "cannot inject into the deteriorated neighborhood the vitality
and healthy glow of a decent environment and cannot fundamentally change
to avoid code enforcement and are thus at a competitive advantage
relative to other owners of substandard housing who are unable to escape
code improvement costs.
227U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems, upAta note 7, at 275.
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the character of a blighted area."2 2 8
A major problem is that we expect too much from housing codes.
It is doubtful whether the substandard housing problem can be solved
with the mere imposition of code enforcement without addressing the
underlying social and economic conditions which generate slum housing.
The failures of the present system of housing code administration is
but one of the causes for our current housing problems. It alone cannot
be blamed for our present slums nor can housing code reform be viewed as
the total cure. Yet, in conjunction with other programs designed to
address the underlying social and economic conditions which generate
slum housing, code enforcement may become an effective means of preserving
existing, adequate housing and rehabilitating deteriorated housing.
By establishing more realistic ideas about the capacity of housing codes
to ameliorate inadequate housing conditions, our disappointments
surrounding the efficacy of housing code enforcement can be greatly
reduced.
2 2 8 Guandolo, Sttptca note 39, at 37.
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APPENDIX A
*
PROPOSED MINIMUM HOUSING CODE
Health and Sanitation Guidelines:
1. Every foundation, roof and exterior wall, door, skylight and window
shall be reasonably weathertight, watertight and dampfree, and shall
be kept in sound condition and good repair. Floors, interior walls
and ceilings shall be in sound and good repair.
2. Toxic paint and materials shall not be used where readily accessible
to children.
3. Every premise shall be graded, drained, and free of standing water,
and maintained in a clean, sanitary and safe condition.
4. Every dwelling shall have heating facilities which are properly
installed, maintained in safe and good working condition and capable
of safely and adequately heating all habitable rooms, bathrooms, and
water closet compartments located therein under ordinary minimum
winter conditions.
5. No owner or occupant shall install, operate or use a heating system
employing a flame that is not vented outside of the structure in a
manner which promotes fire safety and air quality.
6. Every habitable room shall be ventilated by openable areas or by
equivalent mechanical ventilation.
7. Every chimney and smoke pipe, and all flue and vent attachments
thereto, shall be maintained in such condition that there will be no
leakage or backing up of smoke and noxious gases into the dwelling
unit.
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8. Every dwelling unit shall contain not less than a lavatory basin,
tub or shower and a water closet, all in good working condition and
properly connected to an approved water and sewage system or an
approved septic tank installation including an approved absorption
bed. The basin, tub or shower shall be supplied with adequate hot
and cold water.
9. In every dwelling unit in which kitchen facilities are provided, the
unit shall contain a kitchen sink in good working condition and
properly connected to a water and sewage system. Such units shall
also provide adequate garbage disposal facilities.
Safety and Injury Prevention
1. All foundation walls shall be structurally sound, given local
geological and climatic conditions; reasonably insect and rodent-
proof; and maintained in good repair. Foundation walls shall be
considered sound if they are capable of bearing imposed loads and are
not deteriorated.
2. Every dwelling unit shall have safe, unobstructed means of egress
leading to safe and open space at ground level.
3. Where electrical service is provided, the wiring and switches shall
be located and installed so as to avoid the danger of electrical shock.
4. Every supplied facility, piece of equipment, or utility which is
required under this ordinance shall be maintained to function safely
and effectively.
Developed in part from Landman, Ztp ka note 16, at 314-46; American
Public Health Association, zapLa note 202, at 72-131; American Public
Health Association, A P'oposed HouSing Otdinance (1952).
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**
"Habitable" room shall mean a room or enclosed floor space used
or intended to be used for living, sleeping, cooking, or eating purposes,
bathrooms, shower rooms, and water closet compartments, excluding
laundries, pantries, foyers, connecting corridors, closets and storage
spaces.
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